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The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) t and the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) 2 constitute a

bold legislative experiment: a selective restructuring of the federal taxation system as medication for a faint economy. First, the ERTA offers
individuals and small businesses significant tax rate reductions to encourage increased productivity and savings.3 Second, both acts offer

businesses and investors a substantially more lucrative depreciation
system-the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) 4-to stimulate
capital formation. Third, the TEFRA increases Treasury revenues by
restricting certain tax preferences, improving tax collection and enforcement, and increasing various excise taxes. 5 Finally, and the main
concern of this article, the acts revise the existing investment tax credit
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law, B.A., 1945, Wellesley
College; J.D. 1947, Yale University.
** Member of the Texas Bar, J.D., 1982, Vanderbilt University.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.). The ERTA
effects the largest federal tax reduction in United States history. Congressional conferees estimated that the new tax reductions would decrease cumulative Treasury revenues by approximately $750 billion over the next six fiscal years. H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 289.
reprintedin 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 105, 377; see also S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 172, reprintedin 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 105, 268 (similar estimates by the
Senate Committee on Finance and the United States Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE REPORT ON ERTA].
2. Pub. L. No. 97-248, - Stat. -. The enactment of the TEFRA represents congressional
and administration concern over the escalating budget deficits projected for the fiscal years 1983 to
1987. Congressional conferees estimated that the new provisions would increase cumulative
Treasury revenues by approximately $98.3 billion over the next three fiscal years and approximately $214 billion over the next five fiscal years. See H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS No. 7 (September 1982) [hereinafter cited as
CONFERENCE REPORT ON TEFRA]. According to these estimates TEFRA effects the second largest tax increase in history. (The Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat.
1510 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.) effected the largest increase: $117 billion over three years.)
"3. See ERTA §§ 101, 231.
4. TEFRA § 206; ERTA § 201.
5. See TEFRA § 205; ERTA §§211-214.
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provisions to make this historically important indirect government sub-

6
sidy more available and more valuable.
Although Congress expanded certain provisions of the investment
tax credit, it accompanied the expansions with elaborate restrictions on
tax shelters. 7 Congress did this by awkwardly coupling the new law to
the existing Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 465 "at-risk" limitations, which were previously used only to disallow certain artificial
losses." In general, under the new rules, a taxpayer's investment credit
is limited to the dollar amount that he has "at-risk" in otherwise eligible property he has acquired. Prior uses of the "at-risk" rules by the
Internal Revenue Service as a weapon against abuse of otherwise legitimate tax privileges make integration of the two concepts neither surprising nor unusual. Congress, after all, enacted section 465 to restrict
the sheltering of currently taxable income with otherwise deductible
expenses incurred through activities in which the taxpayer risked no
genuine economic investment. 9 The tax shelter potential of tax preferences-whether deductions or credits-does not significantly depend
on the form of the preference. Limiting investment credits to amounts
reflecting the taxpayer's real economic investment, therefore, is an important goal for those protecting Treasury revenues from aggressive tax
planners.
The real significance of the broad incorporation of existing "atrisk" principles, however, lies in the direction to which section 46(c)(8)
currently points.' 0 Congress' extension of section 465 "at-risk" rules in
effect operates as a general statutory condemnation of nonrecourse
financing, creating a presumption that such financing foreshadows
either fraud or an abusive sheltering device. Yet this statutory presumption does not affect publicly held corporations. Consequently, the
new rules' impact on individuals and competitive closely held businesses will create significant disparities. Because the investment tax
credit was designed to encourage taxpayers to make certain investment
decisions, and because nonrecourse financing has many legitimate purposes, limiting the investment tax credit through a general condemnation of nonrecourse financing creates anomalies suggesting that
Congress should further revise the "at-risk" rules of the Code.
6. See TEFRA tits. 11-11.
7. See TEFRA § 211(f) (codified at I.R.C. § 46(c) (West Supp. 1982)).
8. I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally infra notes 121-23 and accompanying
text.
9. See generally infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
10. I.R.C. § 46(c)(8) (West Supp. 1982).
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I.
A.

THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT

The Purpose of the Investment Tax Credit.

Congress originally structured the federal income tax system to
provide the revenue needed for essential operations of the federal government. 1 i By including criteria for the measurement of taxpayers' net
gain, Congress required individuals and corporations to bear national
fiscal expenses in proportion to their ability to pay. Modernization of
the income tax system, however, introduced special provisions-tax expenditures-that neither fix a scale of payment nor contribute to an
accepted definition of net income.' 2 Instead, the federal government
11. Congress first enacted a personal income tax as a temporary revenue measure during the
Civil War. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, repealedby Act of July 1, 1862, ch.
119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473. The United States Supreme Court held a second general income tax
law unconstitutional because it failed to apportion taxes. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429 (1895). The mounting financial needs of the federal government eventually resulted
in the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17 (repealed 1913). In 1912,
Congressional desire to remove sugar from the list of items subject to tariff duties, see H.R. 21,
213, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., threatened federal revenues and prompted an investigation of alternative
revenue possibilities. The House Committee on Ways and Means favored extending "the operation of the corporation-tax law of 1909 to individuals, firms, and copartnerships," H.R. REP. No.
416, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1912), but this practical equivalent of an income tax failed to win the
support of those who disputed Congress' authority to enact an income tax. Ratification of the 16th
Amendment in 1913 dissolved these concerns and enabled President Wilson and Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Underwood to make their tariff reductions more attractive by counterbalancing the anticipated revenue losses with a tax levy on American incomes. See 50 CONG. REC.
332 (1913) (statement of Chairman Underwood). For historical summaries of the events preceding the enactment of the Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § 2,38 Stat. 114, 166-81, repealedby Act
of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 24, 39 Stat. 776, see 6 R. BAKER & W. DODD, PUBLIC PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON, ch. 3, at 1-6 (1926); M. CHIRELSTEIN, L. DAY & E. OWENS, TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 11 (1963); J. DUARTE, THE INCOME TAX Is OBSOLETE, 17-24 (1974); C.
MCCARTHY, B. MANN, B. ABBIN, W. GREGORY, & J. LINDGREN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX,
ITS SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS 3-5 (1968); S. RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (1967). See also Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934) ("The
general object of this act is to put money into the federal treasury ....").
12. In 1967 Harvard Professor Stanley S. Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy, developed the concept of tax expenditures: "Through deliberate departures from accepted concepts of net income and through various special exemptions, deductions and credits,
our tax system does operate to affect the private economy in ways that are usually accomplished
by expenditures-in effect to produce an expenditure system described in tax language." S. Surrey, The United States Tax System--the Need for a Full Accounting, Remarks before the Money
Marketeers (Nov. 15, 1967), reprintedin 125-2 J. ACCT.57, 58 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Surrey,
Remarks]. Professor Surrey saw the income tax system as comprised of two major elements:
[O]ne part comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax on
individual and corporate net income; the second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which Government financial assistance programs are carried out through
special tax provisions rather than direct Government expenditures. This second system is
grafted on to the structure of the income tax proper, it has no basic relation to that
structure and is not necessary to its operation.
S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6 (1973). [hereinafter cited as S. SURREY, PATHWAYS].
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often uses these special provisions to achieve various economic or social objectives unrelated to pure revenue raising, providing vast subsidies without making direct government expenditures.1 3 The
investment tax credit is one of the most significant tax expenditures.14
In 1961, when the American economy was performing significantly below its potential, President Kennedy proposed an investment
tax credit as a centerpiece of his economic recovery program.' 5 Treasury Secretary Dillon argued that the tax credit constituted the most
13. In 1969 the Department of the Treasury reacted to public desires for tax reform by publishing a new method of reporting the effects of special income tax provisions. The new "tax
expenditure budget" listed subsidies provided through the income tax system in a format similar
to that used to list appropriated direct expenditures. See 1969 Economic Report of the President:
HearingsBefore the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (statement of Joseph W. Barr,
Secretary of the Treasury); Hearingson EconomicAnalysis andEfficiency in Government before the
Subcomm. on Economy in Government f/the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 82
(1969) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey). Congress eventually adopted the concept: it required the
examination of tax expenditures as part of Congressional budgetary policy, see Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 3(a)(3), 101(c), 102(a), 88
Stat. 297, 299, 300, 300-01 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2)(3) (1976)), and required the President to include tax expenditures as an item in his recommended budget, see id. § 601, 88 Stat. 297,
323-24 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § I1(e) (1976)).
Naturally, classification problems abound, and the difference between strict income tax provisions and tax expenditures is often clouded. Tax expenditure analysis draws heavily on the HaigSimons definition of net income. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 12, at 12. According to
the Haig-Simons model, personal income is "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights

exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question." H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50
(1938).
Some commentators question tax expenditures because such expenditures do not always seem
a wise method of distributing federal largesse. They are hidden within the income tax system,
bypassing the congressional decisionmaking process normally necessary for enactment and administration of direct federal subsidies. For example, tax-writing committees, rather than committees more knowledgeable about the substantive subject matter under consideration for
government assistance, enact special tax provisions that are usually subject to neither periodic
review nor coordination with prior assistance programs. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note
12, at 1-4; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy. A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 721, 727-31 (1970) (also noting that
tax expenditures have decidedly adverse effects with respect to both horizontal and vertical
equity).
14. Prior to the ERTA, the investment tax credit represented the second largest tax expenditure in the 1980 budget (measured by revenue loss), exceeded in cost only by capital gains. SeeA4
Review of Selected Tax Expenditures: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 480 (1979) (statement of Harry S. Havens,
Director, Program Analysis Division, U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Investment Tax Credit].
15. The Federal Tax System-Messagefrom the President, H.R. Doc. No. 140, 107 CoNG.
REc. 6376, 6377-78 (1961) [hereinafter cited as President'sTax Message]. President Kennedy had
previously noted that "modernization and expansion of the nation's productive plant and equipment are essential to raise productivity, to accelerate economic growth and to strengthen our competitive position in world markets." President's Tax Message: Hearings Conducted by House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1961) [hereinafter cited as President's Tax
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powerful and efficient stimulant available for the ailing economy. 16
Congress passed the proposal in 1962.17 Since then, many commentators have debated the investment tax credit's effectiveness,' 8 but none
have denied that it is a subsidy designed to induce taxpayers to invest
in certain depreciable personal property.' 9 The post-1962 legislative
history further establishes that the investment tax credit is the
equivalent of a federal grant designed to reduce net investment expense

and thereby stimulate business demand for capital goods. In 1964, for
example, congressional repeal of a basis adjustment feature significantly liberalized the credit and greatly increased the incentive value of
Message Hearings],reprintedin 1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 90TH CONG., IST SESS.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1962, at 137 (1967).
16. President's Tax Message Hearings, supra note 15, at 17-23 (statement of Secretary DilIon). Secretary Dillon believed the investment credit was a more potent stimulus than either allowing for accelerated depreciation of new assets or reducing the corporate income tax rates
because the credit would offset only income of companies that invested in qualifying property and
would provide a greater net return on new investment; thus "for any given cost in revenue to the
Treasury over a substantial period, the increase in rate of return, and hence the stimulus to investment, would be much greater under the credit approach." Id. at 21.
17. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 960, 962 (codified in scattered
sections of the I.R.C.). President Kennedy's original proposal used the taxpayer's current year
depreciation allowance as a yardstick to compute the allowable tax credit. For example, the taxpayer could have taken a tax credit equal to 15% of the total plant and equipment cost that exceeded the current year's depreciation allowance, 6% of the investment cost that totaled between
50% and 100% of the current year's depreciation allowance, or only a small minimum credit if the
investment cost totaled less than 50% of the allowance. See President'sTax Message, supra note
15, at 4; President'sTax MessageHearings,supra note 15, at 44-46. The articulated purpose of this
marginal investment subsidy scheme was to induce extraordinary investments rather than normal
replacements. See id at 22-23. But cf. White, Illusions in the MarginalInvestment Subsidy, 15
NAT'L TAX J. 26, 27 (1962) (because of recapture of depreciation, a 15% subsidy of investment in
excess of depreciation equals pure subsidy of only 3% of purchase price plus an interest-free loan
equal to 12% of the purchase price). Almost unanimous objection by business representatives
influenced the House Ways and Means Committee to reject the proposal based on depreciation
allowances and adopt an overall rate of 8% instead. See generaly President's Tax MessageHearings, supra note 15; Investment Credit Plan Rapped, J. CoM. 3 (May 17, 1961).
18. See, e.g., Brown, Comments on Tax Creditsas Investment Incentives, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 198
(1962); Chase, Tax CreditsforInvestment Spending, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 32 (1962); Coen, Tax Policy
andlnvestmentBehavior: Comment, 59 AM. EcON. REV. 370 (1969); Coen, Effects 0/Tax Policy on
Investment in Manufacturing,58 AM. EcON. REV. 200 (1968); Cook, The Investment Credit: Investment Incentiveand CountercyclicalTool, 45 TAXES 227 (1967); Johnson & Carey, The Effect ofthe
Investment Credit on Equipment Replacement Decisions, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 307 (1970); White, supra
note 17; Wiseman, PublicPolicy andtheInvestment Tax Credit, 16 NAT'L TAX J. 36 (1963); Woodward & Panichi, Investment Influences ofthe Tax Credit Program, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 272 (1965).
19. As President Kennedy stated, "Our objective is to provide the largest possible inducement to new investment which would not otherwise be undertaken." President'sTax Message,
supra note 15, at 6378. Secretary Dillon agreed: "The intent is to stimulate investment, not to
give general relief to one particular group of taxpayers." President'sTax Message Hearings,supra
note 15, at 20.
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the subsidy.20 As the American economy grew healthier, inflationary

pressures influenced Congress to restrict demand, first by suspending
the credit during 1966 and 1967,21 and then by repealing it completely
in 1969.22 Two years later, however, Congress responded to a lagging
economy by re-enacting a more liberal version of the investment
credit.23 In 1981 and 1982, after a decade of modification, continued
20. The investment tax credit provisions as enacted in 1962 required reduction of the depreciable tax base of any qualified property in an amount equal to the credit. See Revenue Act of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2(b), 76 Stat. 960, 970 (repealed 1964). Adoption of this requirement-popularly known as the Long Amendment because of its sponsor, Senator Russell Longreflected concern over the revenue cost of the new subsidy. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3304, 3321-22.
Although the Long Amendment may have reduced the amount of revenues lost through the
investment credit, the basis adjustment feature also diminished the credit's incentive effect. For
example, the taxpayer could receive a tax credit in the year of a purchase, but lower depreciation
bases would necessarily create relatively higher amounts of taxable income in subsequent years.
Consequently, in 1964 Congress repealed this requirement returning to the subsidy concept as
originally adopted by the House of Representatives. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272,
§ 203, 78 Stat. 19, 33; see H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1313, 1343. Thereafter, the investment tax credit operated not as an
additional acceleration of depreciation but entirely as a federal subsidy equal to a portion of the
property's cost. Eventually, however, the more lucrative tax benefits of the revised ACRS influenced Congress to reintroduce the concept of partial basis in the TEFRA. See infra notes 46 & 56.
For an in-depth analysis of the effect of the basis adjustment feature, see Sunley, Towards a More
NeutralInvestment Tax Credit, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 209 (1973).
21. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1508. By October, 1966, the American
economy was in its "67th month of uninterrupted expansion following the recession low reached
in February 1961." S.REP. No. 1724, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4327, 4332. Demand for machinery and equipment outstripped the country's capacity to produce these capital goods. As economic activity accelerated, inflationary pressures
prompted federal monetary restraint and finally forced Congress to take action designed to restrain the excessive demand. Id. at 4332-40. Accordingly, Congress suspended the investment tax
credit for property purchased between October 10, 1966, and March 9, 1967. See Act of June 13,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, § 1, 81 Stat. 57, 57 (repealing suspension of credit for property purchased
after March 9, 1967); S.REP. No. 79, 90th Cong., IstSess. 1,reprintedin 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 1198, 1198 (citing abatement of previously existing inflationary pressures). Under
these circumstances, suspension of the investment tax credit indicates the reliance placed by both
the Johnson administration and Congress on the credit as a subsidy with significant potential
effect on private investment expenditures.
22. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 703, 83 Stat. 487, 660-67. Additional
inflationary pressures convinced Congress to abolish the credit for investment in property acquired after April 18, 1969. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., IstSess. 224-27, reprintedin 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2259-62. For descriptive analyses of the credit's phase-out,
see Auerbach, Investment CreditandDepreciationBefore andAfter 1969 Reforms, 4 IND. LEoAL F.
156 (1970); Holtz & Jenkins, The Investment Credit: Act Five-Repeal,48 TAXES 144 (1970); Loring, How to Phase Out the Investment Credit, 29 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 687 (1971).
23. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 101, 85 Stat. 497, 498-99 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 49-50 (1976)). President Nixon had proposed a job development credit providing a tax
credit generally equal to 10% of the cost of new machinery and equipment produced in the United
States and placed into service on or after August 16, 1971. See HearingsBefore House Comn. on
Ways and Means on Tax Proposalscontainedin the President'sNew Economic Policy, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, 11-13 (September 8, 1971) (statement of John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury).
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liberalization, and congressional scrutiny,24 Congress again reacted to

problems by altering the potential benefits of the
the nation's economic
25
investment subsidy.
B.

The ERTA's Liberalization of the Credit.
Prior to the enactment of the ERTA, the Senate Committee on

Finance candidly noted that revision of the investment tax credit was
necessary because the existing rules failed to "provide the investment

stimulus that is essential for economic expansion. '26 The Committee
recommended both a restructuring of the credit and a new cost recovery system that "provides for the more rapid acceleration of cost recov27
ery deductions and maintains or increases the investment tax credit."
Congress adopted the recommendation by enacting, through the
ERTA, four liberalizations in the existing investment tax credit provisions. First, the ERTA included two previously excluded categories of

capital assets in the definition of "eligible property." Second, the
ERTA altered the formula with which a taxpayer computes his qualiAfter August 15, 1972, the credit would have been reduced to 5%. The enacted version of the
proposal, however, generally provided a 7% credit for eligible property either ordered after March
31, 1971 or acquired after August 15, 1971. See Revenue Act of 1971, § 101. The Act also codified the Asset Depreciation Range system that had been adopted under regulatory authority on
June 23, 1971. See id. § 109. For a thoughtful critique of the Congressional policy underlying
reenactment of the credit, see Brannon, The Revenue Act of 1971-Do Tax Incentives Have New
Lie?, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 891 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301, 89 Stat. 26, 36 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 46, 48 (1976) (increase of maximum credit to 10% of qualified investment); Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 801-807, 90 Stat. 1520, 1580-1606 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (extension of credit for four years; revision of carry over provisions; amendment of
recapture rules for certain films and vessels); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 311317, 92 Stat. 2763, 2824-30 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 46-50) (Supp. IV 1980) (permanent extension of
maximum 10% credit; phased-in increase in amount of credit allowable up to 90% of tax liability
in excess of $25,000; increased credit for pollution control facilities; extension of credit to single
purpose agricultural or horticultural structures, to cooperatives and to certain qualified rehabilitated structures).
25. See TEFRA; ERTA §§ 211-214.
26. SENATE REPORT ON ERTA, supra note 1, at 47.
27. Id. The legislative history indicates that Congress sought various objectives-frequently
expressed in the negative-in its revision of the depreciation and investment credit provisions.
The Senate Finance Committee, for example, noted that the existing high rates of inflation reduced the "real value" of depreciation deductions and thereby diminished the certainty, profitability, and attractiveness of new investments in modem assets. Id. The House Ways and Means
Committee echoed these concerns and also expressed dissatisfaction that
because of interactions with the investment tax credit, the current depreciation rules result in unintended biases such that the effective tax rates on income from different types
of equipment can differ by a factor of 10. These biases misdirect spending to less efficient but tax-favored investments and away from more productive investments.
H. R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 73 (1981). Congress also objected to the complexity of
rules that taxpayers, especially small businesses, found "difficult to master and expensive to apply." SENATE REPORT ON ERTA, supra note 1, at 47.
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fled investment in eligible property, in effect increasing the available
dollar amount of the credit. Third, the ERTA expanded the class of
the credit's beneficiaries by creating a de facto "refundable" credit,
through leasing provisions for those who incur little or no tax liability.28 Fourth, the new rules relaxed the required recapture of the credit
in subsequent years.
1. Expanded Categories of Eligible Property. Section 48 of the

Code defines the categories of property eligible for the investment tax
credit.29 Prior to 1981, eligible property--"section 38 property"-generally included certain depreciable, tangible property with a useful life

of at least three years from the date a taxpayer placed the property in
service in a trade, business or investment.30 Section 38 property included almost all types of tangible personal property, 31 but the Code
excluded land, buildings, and their structural components from this
class of eligible properties.32 A host of borderline categories of eligible
property soon developed because the Code lacked a precise, manageable definition of section 38 property.3 3 Further complicated by IRS
28. The TEFRA schedules the expiration of this benefit on December 31, 1983. See TEFRA
§ 209. For a discussion of the repeal of the safe harbor leasing provisions of section 168, see in/ra
notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
29. See I.R.C. § 48(a) (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
30. See id § 48(a)(1).
31. I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(A) (1976) includes within the definition of eligible section 38 property
all "tangible personal property" other than an air conditioning or heating unit.
32. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1982). Under the regulations, "tangible personal
property" is defined as "any tangible property except land and improvements thereto." Treas.
Reg. § IA8-1(c) (1965).
33. For example, the Code provides that "other tangible property" that qualifies for the
credit, even if not "personal" property, must not be a building or a structural component of a
building, and must fit into one of the categories set forth in I.R.C. section 48(a)(l)(B) (used "as an
integral part" of certain specified activities; or classified as a research facility or facility for bulk
storage of fungible commodities used "in connection with" one of the specified activities). Prior to
the ERTA, section 48(a)(1) also listed four other classes of property eligible for the credit: certain
elevators or escalators, single purpose agricultural or horticultural structures, qualified rehabilitated buildings and qualified timber property. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(C)-(F) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). Obviously, in establishing these heterogeneous categories, Congress frequently blurred
traditional distinctions between personal and real property.
Although an item appears to qualify as section 38 property, it can lose that status by falling
within any of several statutory exceptions. Section 48 generally denies any investment tax credit
for property used predominantly outside the United States, see I.R.C. § 48(a)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1982); but that section then excepts aircraft, ships, railroad rolling stock, communications satellites
and telephone cables used in international communications from this denial of the credit. See id.
§ 48(a)(2)(B). Congress also denied the credit for property "completed outside the United States"
(defined to include Puerto Rico and all United States possessions) or property having a basis less
than 50% of which "is attributable to value added within the United States." I.R.C. § 48(a)(7). If
the President determines, however, that the section 48 denial of credit to any article of predominantly foreign origin is not in the public interest, he may piake it eligible for the credit by executive order. I.R.C. § 48(a)(7)(C)-(D); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(g) (1965); § 1.48-1(o) (1972).
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regulations and Revenue Rulings from the Treasury, 34 these tortuous

descriptions of eligible property produced confusion and dispute beFor reasons that are not clear, Congress also denied an investment credit for section 38 property used predominantly for lodging. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(3) (1976). Prior to the ERTA, three statutory exceptions to the lodging exclusion existed. First, furnishings qualified for the credit if used
"where the predominant portion of the accommodations is used by transients": for example, in a
hotel or motel. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(3)(B) (1976). Second, the credit applied to section 38 property
used in publicly accessible commercial facilities located within an otherwise ineligible lodging.
For example, credit would be available for equipment in a drugstore or restaurant located within
an apartment building. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(3)(A) (1976). Third, the credit applied to "coin-operated vending machines and coin-operated washing machines and dryers" even if located in a
lodging. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(3)(C) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(h)(2)(i) (1972). Presumably, noncoin-operated washers and dryers in the same lodging did not deserve the tax subsidy.
Congress also disallowed the credit for other classes of property. For example, there is no
credit for property used by a tax exempt organization unless it is used predominantly in a taxable
unrelated trade or business, see I.R.C. § 48(a)(4) (1976); no credit for property used by the United
States, other governmental units, or tax exempt international organizations other than the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium and its successors, see I.R.C. § 48(a)(5) (1976);
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(k); no credit for horses (although credit is available for other livestock, see
6
I.R.C. § 48(a)(6), (p)( ) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); and no credit available for boilers fueled by oil,
gas or certain petroleum products unless the boilers meet an "exempt use" test, see I.R.C..
§ 48(a)(10) (Supp. IV 1979). For a general discussion of the difficulties encountered in determining what property is eligible for the credit, see Note, The Great Section 38 PropertyMuddle, 28
VAND. L. REv. 1025 (1975).
34. Because the term "tangible personal property" generally excludes buildings and other
inherently permanent structures, as well as their structural components, no credit is available for
swimming pools, paved parking areas, wharves, bridges, or fences. See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c).
Property attached to a building, however, is not necessarily an inherently permanent structure or a
structural component, and may qualify for the credit. Regulations allow the credit for grocery
counters, testing equipment, display racks, and neon signs located in "or attached to" a building.
See id If the item is "in the nature of machinery," rather than a structural component of a
building, it can qualify for the credit even if located outside a structure. Thus, the credit applies to
"a gasoline pump, hydraulic car lift, or automatic vending machine, although annexed to the
ground." See id Moreover, local law does not control the issue of whether a particular item is
"tangible" or "personal" property for the purposes of the investment credit. Id
The regulations modified the customary definition of the term "building and structural components" by taking the position that a structure may be so closely related to the use of the property
it houses that, chameleon-like, it takes on the legal coloration and nature of that property. Indications of this relation include situations in which the structure would be replaced were the property
it houses replaced; where the structure is "specifically-designed to provide for the stress and other
demands" of the housed machinery; or where the structure "could not be economically used for
other purposes." See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1). Structures characterized as machinery, and thus
eligible for the credit, include oil and gas storage tanks, grain storage bins, silos, fractionating
towers, blast furnaces, basic oxygen furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns, and coal tipples. See id.
The Treasury has, however, found it difficult to draw the line between "inherently permanent" structural components (ineligible for credit) and attached but less permanent "personal"
property (eligible for credit). The Treasury has disallowed the credit for a bank's drive-up teller's
booth (structure) but allowed credit for bank vault doors and drive-up teller's window (not structural components). See Rev. Rul. 79, 1965-1 C.B. 26. In contrast, the Tax Court found a prefabricated customer booth for a film processing company not "inherently permanent" and thus
qualified for the credit, see Film N' Photos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 709 (1978).
The IRS had previously determined that a launderette contained in a house trailer mounted on
concrete blocks was an inherently permanent structure not qualifying for the credit. See Rev. Rul.
291, 1977-2 C.B. 7.
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tween taxpayers and the Service.35 By 1981 a maze of intricate definitional rules and exceptions confronted any taxpayer who sought to
Another gratuitous complexity added by the Regulations affects air conditioning and heating
units. Congress unequivocally denied the credit to such units. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
1980). The Regulations, however, make an exception for, and do not include as a structural component, certain machinery, "the sole justification for the installation of which is the fact that such
machinery is required to meet temperature or humidity requirements which are essential for the
operation of other machinery or the processing of materials or foodstuffs." See Treas. Reg. § 1.48l(e)(2). Machinery may meet the "sole justification" criterion even though that machinery "incidentally" provides for the comfort of personnel or serves "to an insubstantial degree" areas where
temperature or humidity requirements are not essential. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2); Vf. Rev. Rul.
405, 1968-2 C.B. 35 (holding that refrigeration equipment installed by a meat processor to convert
a building to a cold storage warehouse qualified for credit but special insulation installed to make
the building suitable as cold storage warehouse was an ineligible "structural component").
35. Cases involving outdoor advertising signs illustrate the continual wrangling between taxpayers and the IRS over whether property is "inherently permanent" and thus ineligible for the
credit. See Whiteco Indus. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 664 (1975) (outdoor wood advertising signs,
secured in place with cement, were not "inherently permanent" and qualified for credit); National
Advertising Co. v. United States, 507 F.2d 850 (Ct. C1. 1974) (credit granted to signs attached to
poles and rooftops); Alabama Displays, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (credit
for free-standing highway billboards). But see Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349
(1981) (concrete foundations designed to hold advertising sign poles and the poles embedded in
them were "inherently permanent structures" not eligible for credit).
Other examples of the confusion possible under the eligible property requirements include
disputes over complex equipment installations: a taxpayer may obtain credit for certain components resembling machinery, even though they possess some characteristics of inherently permanent structures, but the IRS may deny credit to other components in the same system. See
Weirick v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 446 (1974) (credit granted for towers supporting ski lift because
equivalent to "machinery" although permanently attached to land, but earth ramps constructed to
facilitate patrons' access to ski lifts not eligible because inherently permanent structures); Priv.
Let. Rul. 8,036,009, 1980 Fed. Taxes: Priv. Let. Rul. (P-H) § 44 (May 29, 1980) (snowmaking
guns, flexible hoses and water pumps in ski resort's snowmaker qualified for credit, but buried
pipelines and electric lines essential to operate equipment were permanent structures and did not
qualify); Priv. Let. Rul. 8,009,032, 1980 Fed. Taxes: Priv. Let. Rul. (P-H) § 48 (Nov. 29, 1979)
(amusement slide is inherently permanent and ineligible for credit, but plastic sleds used in slide
qualify).
Taxpayers acquiring sewage disposal equipment and electrical equipment have argued, with
differing degrees of success, that such equipment qualifies for the credit as tangible personal property under I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) because it is not inherently permanent or, in the
alternative, that the taxpayer is in the business of "furnishing. . .electrical. . . or sewage disposal services" and the property is used "as an integral part" of such services and therefore qualifies
for the credit under Code section 48(a)(1)(B)(ii). See Hayden Island, Inc. v. United States, 380 F.
Supp. 96 (D. Or. 1974) (sewage treatment plant installed at ground level and secured to a concrete
slab not inherently permanent structure and qualified for credit); Johnston v. United States, 80-1
U.S.T.C. 19199 (D. Mont. 1979) (movable sewage system, although installed underground, qualified as tangible personal property eligible for credit even though court rejected claim of taxpayer,
a trailer park operator, that he was also engaged in the separate business of furnishing water and
sewage service); Graybeal v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1979) (court found that taxpayer operating recreational vehicle campground also engaged in separate business of furnishing
utilities so that utilities equipment met "integral part" test and qualified for credit as "other tangible property"); Westroads, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 682 (1978), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 2 (credit
allowed for equipment relating to generation of electricity when court found taxpayer engaged in
two businesses, shopping center development and generation of electricity, so that taxpayer met
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identify investments eligible for the investment tax credit. Unfortunately, the ERTA did not address the planning problems created by
this complex definition of eligible property; 36 instead, Congress merely
37
defined new categories of eligible property.
The new categories did, however, significantly expand the scope of
the tax credit. For example, the credit now extends to two previously
ineligible types of tangible property: certain storage facilities for petroleum products, 38 and certain railroad rolling stock. 39 The ERTA also
expanded the availability of the credit for investments in certain real
property projects. Congress replaced the prior ten percent credit for
qualified rehabilitation expenditures on buildings at least twenty years
the "integral part" test); Everhart v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 328 (1973) (sewage disposal system at
a shopping center inherently permanent and not qualified for credit); Priv. Let. Rul. 8,005,017,
1980 Fed. Taxes: Priv. Let. Rul. (P-H) § 42 (Oct. 31, 1979) (credit denied for dam built to supply
hydroelectric power for use in cotton weaving mill when Service determined that dam not essential to operation of mill); Priv. Let. Rul. 7,725,002, 1977 Fed. Taxes: Priv. Let. Rul. (P-H) § 265
(Mar. 22, 1977) (earthen dam constructed to supply water to a papermaking business qualified for
credit because dam was an "integral part" of papermaking business).
36. Witnesses before congressional subcommittees considering revisions of the investment
tax credit provisions had urged a "more rational and straightforward line of demarcation between
eligible and ineligible property," removal of "artificial distinctions" between qualified and unqualified property, and alleviation of the difficulty in distinguishing between ineligible structures
and eligible equipment. HEARINGS ON INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT, supra note 14, at 232-34 (statement of Dale W. Wickham, formerly staff counsel to the Joint Committee on Taxation), at 262,
265-66 (statement of Robert T. Benz), and at 269-70 (statement of John P. Doane). The Service
conceded that the question of what property qualifies for the credit "remains one of the most
heavily litigated issues in the investment credit area" and attributed the problem to the failure of
Congress to provide a clear legislative intent or a "consistent policy" in its criteria for distinguishing eligible from ineligible property. See also id at 178, 192 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner, IRS).
37. This was consistent with Congress' announced intent to maintain or increase the investment credit. SENATE REPORT ON ERTA, supra note 1, at 47.
38. Prior to the ERTA, petroleum storage facilities constituted section 38 property only if
used in a manufacturing, production or extraction process. Consequently, storage facilities used
only for distribution failed to qualify for the credit. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
94 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA]. The
ERTA eliminated this distinction by simply adding distribution storage facilities for "petroleum
or any primary product of petroleum" to section 38 property. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(I)(G) (West
Supp. 1982). The term "primary product of petroleum" applies only to the primary product of oil
(not gas) as defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.993-3(g)(3)(i). See supra JOINT COMMITrEE EXPLANATION
OF ERTA.
39. I.R.C. § 48(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1982). The rolling stock extension operates through a
broadening of the rules for property used outside the United States. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Prior to the ERTA, section 48(a)(2)(B)(ii) conferred section 38 status on rolling stock
used both within and without the United States only when the equipment was owned by a domestic railroad. Under current law, any United States person owning such roling stock-not just a
railroad-may claim the credit. See § 48(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II).
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old 4° with three new amounts of credit: (1) a rehabilitation credit for
qualified expenditures on nonresidential, depreciable buildings thirty
to thirty-nine years old;41 (2) a more generous rehabilitation credit for
qualified expenditures on nonresidential, depreciable buildings at least
forty years old;42 and (3) a very generous rehabilitation credit for expenditures on both nonresidential and residential depreciable certified
43
historic structures.

2. IncreasedAmount of Credit. Probably more significant than

the added categories of eligible property are the potential increases in
the credit useable for all eligible property. The investment tax credit is
calculated, in part, as a "regular percentage" of the amount of "quali40. From the enactment of the credit in 1962 until 1978, owners of buildings and their structural components could not receive the investment credit. The Revenue Act of 1978, however,
extended the investment credit to qualified rehabilitation expenditures incurred in connection
with existing buildings used in businesses or income producing activities and not used for residential purposes. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 315, 92 Stat. 2763, 2828 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 48(a)(l)(E), (g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Congress hoped to "enable business to...
modernize existing structures" in order to promote "greater stability in the economic vitality of
areas that have been deteriorating." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., IST
SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978 155 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF 1978 AcT]. Thus, section 48(a) was amended to
add as eligible section 38 property that portion of the basis of a qualified rehabilitated building
attributable to qualified rehabilitation expenditures. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(l)(E), (g) (1976 & Supp,
IV 1980). When considering the ERTA, Congress continued to give much weight to policy considerations not directly concerned with raising revenue or defining income. For example, Congress examined in some detail the possible trade-off costs of taxpayers building new structures
instead of rehabilitating older buildings. JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, stpra note
38, at 113.
41. The credit is 15% for qualified rehabilitation expenditures on a building between 30 and
40 years old. See I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(F)(i), (iii)(I) (West Supp. 1982).
42. The credit is 20% for qualified rehabilitation expenditures on a building at least 40 years
old. See I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(F)(i), (iii)(II) (West Supp. 1982).
43. The credit is 25% for qualified rehabilitation expenditures on a certified historic structure.
See I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(F)(i), (iii)(III) (West Supp. 1982). Code section 48 includes among "certified historic structures" buildings listed in the National Register of Historic Places or located in a
registered historic district and certified by the Secretary of the Interior as being of historic significance to the district. See § 48(g)(3). Rehabilitation undertaken on a building in a registered historic district that has not been designated as a certified historic structure qualifies for neither the
general 15% nor the 20% credit unless the taxpayer obtains a certificate from the Secretary of the
Interior that the building is not of historic significance to the district. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 115. This reverses pre-ERTA law which allowed the
general rehabilitation credit then in effect for a building in an historic district without requiring
that the taxpayer affirmatively obtain a certificate from the Secretary of the Interior. See
§ 48(g)(2)(B)(iv).
The new at-risk rules imposed in the investment credit area under Code section 46, discussed
infra text accompanying notes 124-30, do not apply to the rehabilitation tax credits because the atrisk rules exclude from their coverage property used in a real estate activity. See I.R.C.
§§ 46(c)(8)(A)(ii), 465(c)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1982).
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fled investment" made each year.44 Congress increased the amount of
the investment credit for eligible property4 5 placed in service after December 31, 1980 and simplified the calculation process. Although the
formula remains the same and the regular investment credit percentage
generally still'stands at 10%,46 Congress altered the rules that deter-

mine the amount of the taxpayer's "qualified investment" eligible for
the 10% credit.47
Before the ERTA, the amount of qualified investment in property
depended on the property's actual useful life. For example, 100% of
the basis of eligible property constituted qualified investment if that

property had a useful life of at least seven years.48 If, however, the
property had a useful life of five or six years, only two thirds of its basis
44. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1982). In addition to the regular investment credit

percentage on which this article focuses, three other percentages affect the amount of the total tax
credit: the "energy percentage," the "employee plan percentage," and the "rehabilitation percentage." See id § 46(a)(2)(A). Section 46(a)(2)(C) sets forth a variable energy percentage of 10% for
qualified intercity buses and biomass property; 11% for qualified hydroelectric generating property; and 15% for solar, wind, geothermal or ocean-thermal property. Section 48(1) describes the
property eligible for the varying rates. Differing employee plan percentages-available only to a
corporation with an employee stock option plan qualified under section 49(A)-appear in section
46(a)(2)(E). Section 46(a)(2)(F) provides a rehabilitation percentage of 15% for a building at least
30 years old, 20% for a building at least 40 years old, or 25% for a certified historic structure. For
an explanation of the ERTA's impact on the definition of property entitled to a tax credit for
rehabilitation, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 29-43.
46. The combined effect of the capital recovery provisions of the Code under the ERTA-the
regular investment credit and the cost recovery deductions allowed under the ACRS-often allowed greater tax benefits in the year of investment than expensing the full cost of the property.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION & STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 97TH

CoNG., 2D SEss., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES 101-02 (Comm.
Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES]. In 1982,
Congress reacted to fears of overgenerous tax benefits flowing from the ACRS, in part, by reenacting a basis adjustment provision. See TEFRA § 205; supra note 20; infra note 56. The TEFRA
also provided that a taxpayer could avoid this reduction of basis by electing a lesser regular investment credit percentage-in general, two points lower than the regular percentage. See I.R.C.
§ 48(a)(4) (1976 & West Supp. 1982). The conference report indicates that this election is intended
as a relief provision:
A taxpayer who makes this election does not have to make a basis adjustment. In the
case of partnerships, the election is made at the partnership level. The election is intended to deal with the case in which a taxpayer cannot claim all of the regular investment credits he earns because of the 85-percent-of-tax-liability limitation. In these cases,
taxpayers could be forced to make a basis adjustment and suffer a deferral of deductions
for which they would have received a tax benefit, because they earn credits they will be
"able to use only after carrying them forward for several years. Under the conference
agreement, these taxpayers are able to avoid this problem by electing the reduced credit.
CONFERENCE REPORT ON TEFRA, supra note 2, at 481-82.
47. See ERTA § 21 1(a).
48. I.R.C. § 46(c)(2) (West Supp. 1981). The Code required the purchaser of eligible property to use the same useful life for investment credit purposes that he adopted for depreciation
purposes.
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constitued qualified investment.4 9 Only one third of a property's basis

was qualified investment if the property had a useful life of three or
four years,5 0 and no portion of the basis of property with a useful life of

5
less than three years was a qualified investment. '
Under the ERTA, the amount of the qualified investment for
property placed in service after December 31, 1980 depends not on the

property's useful life, but on the recovery class to which the asset belongs under the ACRS.52 If the eligible property falls within a recovery
class of at least five-year property,5 3 then 100% of the basis of that
property constitutes qualified investment. Sixty percent of the basis of
eligible three-year property, the lowest ACRS class, qualifies under the
new liberalized provisions of ERTA.5 4 The introduction of this new
"two-tier" effective investment credit rate55 enhances the value of the

credit as a subsidy in two ways: (1) fewer uncertainties created by the
Code's artificial concepts of an asset's useful life accompany planned
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See I.R.C. § 46(c)(7) (West Supp. 1982). Under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS), see id. § 168, the Code divides property into five classes instead of the more than 100
different property classes of the old Class Life Asset Depreciation Range System (ADR) guide to
an asset's useful life. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I1 (1970); Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-1 C.B. 548. The
ACRS provides a taxpayer with capital cost recovery through "accelerated methods over predetermined recovery periods that are generally unrelated to, but shorter than, prior useful lives." See
JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 75-76. Specifically, the ACRS establishes 3-year property, 5-year property, 10-year property, 15-year real property and 15-year
public utility property classes. See I.R.C. § 168(c)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
53. I.R.C. § 46(c)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1982). Three-year property includes depreciable tangible personalty with a class life under the ADR system of four years or less and property used in
connection with research and experimentation. Common assets in the three-year class are cars,
light-duty trucks, and research and experimentation equipment. Five-year property is the catchall
classification for eligible tangible property that does not fall into any of the other specified recovery classes. As a result, most eligible depreciable personal property now falls within the five-year
class and generates the full 10% investment credit.
54. I.R.C. § 46(c)(7)(B) (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 53. Two commentators have suggested that assets with a useful life of less than three years, previously ineligible for accelerated
depreciation and the investment credit, will now be included in the 3-year ACRS recovery class
and will therefore qualify for accelerated recovery under section 168. These assets include items
such as glassware, silverware, linens, and special tools used in the manufacture of glass products.
If this observation proves correct, 60% of the basis of these assets, which never before qualified for
an investment tax credit, will now generate a credit. See Luscombe & Chevis, Faster,Simpler
DepreciationRules AvailableforAll Properly Under the New Tax Legislation, 55 J. TAX'N 194, 195
n.7 (1981).
55. "Effective investment credit rate," as used in this article, means the regular investment
credit rate multiplied by the percentage of the basis of the eligible property that represents "qualified investment." For example, eligible three-year property under the ACRS, for which 60% of
basis may be used in calculating the credit, will yield a 6% effective rate: 60% basis x 10% regular
percentage = 6% effective rate.
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business investments; and (2) acquisition of short-lived section 38 prop56
erty now entitles the taxpayer to comparatively greater credit benefits.

For example, eligible property that the taxpayer placed in service
before January 1, 1981, and that had a four-year useful life under the

old ADR, will generate an effective investment credit rate of 3 1/3%.
Identical property placed in service after December 31, 1982 will fall
within the three-year ACRS recovery class and thereby generate an effective rate of either 6% or, if subject to the basis adjustment feature of

section 48(g), an elective rate of 4%. Eligible property in the five-year
recovery class will generate either a 10% or 8%credit, as compared with
the 6 2/3% credit generated prior to the ERTA.

Even if the taxpayer exercises the option under the Code of extending recovery through ACRS-using deductions over a period of
time longer than the recovery class to which the property belongs 57the new ACRS recovery classification still controls the investment tax
credit and produces the more lucrative two-tier benefits. 58 If section 38

property does not fall within the definition of "recovery property,"
however, the pre-ERTA three-tier system determines the amount of

qualified investment.5 9 As an illustration, the ERTA excludes from its
definition of recovery property, under an "anti-churning" concept, 60
56. Although the TEFRA changes some investment credit provisions, it aims more generally

at reducing the benefits of the ACRS. The ERTA provisions for an increased amount of qualified
investment in eligible property technically survived congressional enactment of the TEFRA in
1982. Reintroduction of a variation of the original basis adjustment feature will, however, increase the net cost of investment in property placed in service after December 31, 1982.
Under the ERTA provisions, 100% of the basis of section 38 property generally qualified for
ACRS deductions. A taxpayer reduced the basis of property by only the full amount of any
qualified credit available for expenditures on qualified rehabilitation of certain nonhistoric structures. See I.R.C. §§ 48(g)(5), 1016 (a)(23) (1976 & West Supp. 1982). The TEFRA, on the other
hand, requires taxpayers to reduce the basis of eligible section 38 property by 50% of the amount
of any regular, energy, or certified historic structure investment tax credit. TEFRA § 205(a). (A
taxpayer may avoid the basis adjustment by electing a two percentage point reduction in the
credit. See supra note 46.) The new basis reduction provisions apply generally to property placed
in service after December 31, 1982, but are subject to several important transitional rules that may

exempt certain property, under certain conditions, from the basis adjustment-even though placed
in service as late as December 31, 1985. See id § 205(c).
The TEFRA also includes basis adjustment provisions for disposition of previously adjusted
section 38 property. Immediately before a disposition of previously adjusted section 38 property,
the taxpayer must increase the basis of that property by an amount equal to 50% of any recaptured
credit. See id § 205(a). Thus, the taxpayer who receives less than a full tax credit benefit because
of recapture from an early disposition of eligible property may reflect loss of that benefit by
readjusting upward the basis of the disposed property. For discussion of general rules of investment credit recapture, see infra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3) (West Supp. 1982).
58. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 95.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
60. I.R.C. § 168(e)(4) (West Supp. 1982). For a discussion of the anti-churning rules and the
definitions of a "related person," see JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38,
at 108-09.
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certain property placed in service prior to January 1, 1981, and transferred to a related person after December 31, 1980.61 This exclusion
prevents the taxpayer from taking advantage of the increased ACRS
and investment credit benefits by artificially reclassifying the property
62
so as to trigger the old three-tier system.
The changed law most directly benefits purchasers of new eligible
property, but it also increases the potential credit for acquisition of
used section 38 property.6 3 By 1985 the ERTA will increase the maximum amount of used property that may constitute qualified investment
during any one taxable year from $100,000 to $150,000.64 It does not,
however, relax the definitional distinction between new and used sec65
tion 38 property.
Congress also enlarged the time frame during which a taxpayer
can benefit from the investment credit. In any taxable year the amount
of useable investment credit has always been subject to a ceiling based
on the taxpayer's "liability for tax."'66 Since 1978 the formula used has
permitted the credit to offset total tax liability in any tax year by an
amount equal to $25,000 plus a percentage of the taxpayer's tax liabil61. See I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982).
62. Also excluded from the ERTA's definition of "recovery property" and, therefore, from
the increased benefits of the new credit computations, is property that the taxpayer elects to depreciate under any method not expressed in a term of years (for example, the unit of production
method or the income forecast method, see § 168(e)(2)) or certain public utility property, see
§ 168(e)(3). The favorable provisions of prior law nevertheless continue to apply to pollution
control facilities, see § 46(c)(5) (qualified investment equals 100% even though five or six year
useful life), and commuter highway vehicles, see § 46(c)(6) (qualified investment equals 100%
even though three, four, five, or six year useful life).
63. See I.R.C. § 48(c)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
64. See id. The new rules limit a taxpayer's qualified investment in used property phase in
this ceiling over four years, providing an interim ceiling of $125,000 during that time.
65. Compare I.R.C. § 48(b) (1976) with I.R.C. § 48(c) (West Supp. 1982). If the taxpayer first
uses the property, or if he constructs, reconstructs, or erects the property, it is classified as "new"
section 38 property. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.48-2(a), 1.48-3 (1981).
The ERTA did repeal the requirement that property eligible for the elective credit for qualified progress expenditures incurred on a long-term construction project have a useful life of at
least seven years. See § 46(d)(1). Henceforth, if the property falls within one of the ACRS recovery classes, the taxpayer's qualified investment will depend on the percentage normally associated
with the recovery class into which the taxpayer anticipates the property will fall when ultimately
placed in service. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54. On the other hand, the qualified
investment in non-recovery class property will depend on a "reasonable expectation" of its useful
life when ultimately placed in service. See § 46(d)(1)(A)(ii); H. R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 216-17 (1981).
66. For purposes of the annual ceiling on the credit, the term "liability for tax" means the
normal tax imposed by chapter 1 of the Code reduced by the credit for foreign taxes and the credit
for the elderly. See I.R.C. § 46(a)(4) (1976). The term does not include, and the investment credit
cannot be used to offset, certain other special taxes, such as the minimum tax on tax preferences,
the accumulated earnings tax, and the personal holding company tax. See id.
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$25,000.67

The percentage of tax liability in excess of

$25,000 is 90% for tax years ending in 198268 and 85% for tax years

beginning after December 31, 1982.69 Prior to the ERTA, the amount
of the investment credit not useable in any year due to the tax liablity

ceiling could be carried back and applied against the taxpayer's tax
liability for the preceding three years and carried forward and applied

against his tax liability in the next seven years.70 The ERTA expands
these carryover provisions. Excess investment credit can still be carried
back to the prior three years, but for years ending after December 31,

1973, the ERTA allows unused investment credits to be carried forward
to each of the fifteen years succeeding the unused credit year. 7'
3. An Experiment: Grantingthe Benefits ofthe Creditto Taxpayers
With Little or No Tax Liability Through Equipment Leasing Provisions. Besides increasing the amount of the investment tax credit and

its availability to the usual purchaser of qualified property, the ERTA
temporarily expands the scope of the subsidy to benefit taxpayers who

incur little or no tax liability. Ordinarily such taxpayers cannot take
advantage of a credit against tax. A government subsidy administered

through the Internal Revenue Code necessarily limits its benefits to
those within the tax system, and those who incur no tax liability against

which a credit can apply derive no benefits-and therefore experience
no incentive-from a subsidy structured as a credit. The government
bestows its largess only on those who make taxable profits; 72 tax ex-

empt organizations, government institutions, and even taxable persons
who currently are not profitable fail to receive the full benefit of the

government charity.
Opponents of tax expenditures tout this shortcoming as evidence
of the inequity of indirect tax expenditures. 73 Professor Surrey, for ex67. See I.R.C. § 46(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Congress has steadily liberalized the credit
by increasing the ceiling percentage applied to tax liability in excess of $25,000 from 50% for tax
years ending prior to 1979 to 60% (1979), 70% (1980), 80% (1981) to the current 90%.
68. I.R.C. § 46(a)(3)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
69. Effective with taxable years beginning after December 31, 1982, the TEFRA reduces
from 90% to 85% the percentage of income tax liability in excess of $25,000 that may be offset by
the investment tax credit. See TEFRA §205(b).
70. See I.R.C. § 46(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
71. ERTA § 207(c)(1) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 46(b)(1), 50(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982)).
72. Although the carryover provisions were designed to help loss companies, see supra text
accompanying notes 67-71, the carryback feature has no value to a new business without prior
earnings, or to an established corporation that has experienced three years of losses which have
eliminated tax liability during those years. The carryforward provision, on the other hand, does
have a limited value: it offers a promise of future benefits when and if the company becomes
profitable. The company may, however, need more immediate economic benefits to make the
incentive effective.
73. See Surrey, supra note 13, at 720-25.
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ample, points to "inequitable effects and upside-down benefits" and

concludes that direct government support is generally preferable to the
current system of tax incentives. 74 Advocates of the investment credit,

however, have made similar observations and have concluded that the
real inequity of this subsidy stems from an artificial limitation based on
the recipient's tax liability.75 A credit saddled with this limitation gives
little aid to those industries that Congress intended to benefit-industries weakened by competition from foreign imports and industries
with inadequate tax liability against which to offset the credit. 76 Many
investment credit analysts therefore advocate repeal of this liability
ceiling and adoption of a refundable credit for taxable persons without
adequate tax

77

liability.

Although a refundable credit would further the concept of a pure
economic subsidy, Congress has considered this solution unpalatable
on administrative and political grounds.78 The ninety-seventh Con-

gress did, however, attempt to remedy the inequity by indirectly providing some economic benefit from the investment credit without
regard to the recipient's tax liability. 79 The remedy consists of certain

safe harbor provisions that, in effect, permit the transfer of otherwise
unuseable tax credits from one corporation to another corporation-a
profitable one-that can realize an immediate tax reduction from the
credit. The profitable corporation can, by acquiring certain section 38
these tax savings back to the otherwise ineligible
property, channel
corporation. 80
74. Id. at 722.
75. See Hearings on Investment Tax Credit,supra note 14, at 218-22 (statement of Dale W.
Wickham). Under the existing investment credit system, a large, profitable company would effectively spend only $9,000 for $10,000 worth of equipment after taking account of the credit. A
small, family enterprise with no profits to generate tax liability would have to expend the full
$10,000 for such equipment; see also id at 169 (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
76. See Sunley, supra note 20, at 216; Hearingson Investment Tax Credit,supra note 14, at
286-87 (statement of James D. McKevitt, National Federation of Independent Business), 219-22
(statement of Dale W. Wickham).
77. See Hearings on Investment Tax Credit,supra note 14, at 170-71 (statement of Emil M.
Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy), 218-22 (statement of Dale W.
Wickham).
78. As one commentator has noted, the Department of the Treasury is composed of "tax
lawyers trained to think in tax concepts,. . . [blut tax concepts. . . often have little relevance to
the development of properly structured spending programs." McDaniel, Simplcation Symposium
FederalIncome Tax Simploication: The FoliticalProcess, 34 TAX L. REv. 27, 33-34 (1978). See
Hearings on Investment Tax Credit,supra note 14, at 197-98 (Treasury responses to questions on
investment tax credit).
79. ERTA § 201(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 168(0(8) (West Supp. 1982)).
80. See JOINT COMMITrEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 102.
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In theory, corporations could always have obtained an investment
credit indirectly by leasing equipment from profitable companies that
could absorb, with their tax liability, the benefits of the investment
credit. Because of this tax benefit, the lessors could charge the lessees
lower rent. Prior to the ERTA, however, frequent disputes over the
characterization of the transaction-whether it was a lease that would
generate the indirect benefit or a conditional sale or financing agreement that would not-defeated effective use of this technique to expand the value of the investment credit.8 ' If the IRS characterized the
arrangement as a lease, the lessee could deduct rental payments for use
of the property in its trade or business; the lessor would retain ownership of the property entitling it to applicable depreciation deductions
and investment tax credits associated with ownership, and the lessor
would recognize the lessee's rental payments as ordinary income. 82 On
the other hand, if the Service recast the transfer as a financing arrangement or as a conditional sale, the "lessee" would obtain ownership for
tax purposes. This would entitle it to depreciation deductions and investment tax credits, which it frequently could not use. Moreover, the
lessee would lose its deduction for "rental" payments.8 3 Consequently,
the overall expense of acquiring equipment was greater when the Serv81. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 30, 1976-2 C.B. 647; Rev. Proc. 28, 1975-1 C.B. 752; Rev. Proc. 21,
1975-1 C.B. 715. In these Revenue Procedures, the Service required of genuine leasing arrangements that (1) the lessor have at least a 20% at-risk investment in the property; (2) the lessor derive
certain specified economic and business advantages from the transaction apart from tax benefits:
(3) the lessee not have the right to purchase the property at a price below fair market value; (4) the
lessee not have an investment in the lease and not lend any of the purchase price to the lessorowner, and (5) at the end of the lease term, use of the property by someone other than the lessee be
commercially feasible. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 103.
82. For the general economic advantages to the seller-lessee in a transaction treated as a
genuine sale-leaseback, see Cary, CorporateFinancingThrough the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations,62 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1948). The term "sale-leaseback" arose because the lessee often sells the equipment it uses to the lessor before leasing it back.
See infra text accompanying note 89.
83. In determining whether a sale-leaseback constitutes, for tax purposes. a true lease or a
financing agreement, both the Service and the courts have adopted an "objective economic realities" test. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). in which the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the economic substance approach and concluded that a lease was in fact a "lease" for
tax purposes. In so doing, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, which had upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of depreciation deductions to a buyer-lessor by viewing the transaction as a
loan rather than a sale and leaseback. See Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A
FailureofJudicialProcess,66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981). Under the same economic substance
test, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sustained the Commissioner's disallowance of
deductions for "rental" payments from a seller-lessee to the buyer-lessor because the court found
that the substance of the transaction was a loan rather than a sale-leaseback. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
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ice refused to recognize these transactions as true leases, 84 and taxpay-

ers often could not meet strict IRS requirements for advance letter
rulings on the characterization of a particular transaction. 85
The ERTA swept away the IRS guidelines, establishing in their

place a guarantee that a transaction would be treated as a lease, with
concomitant tax benefits, if it met five safe harbor requirements.

6

Fur-

thermore, Congress directed that the IRS consider only these five factors. 87 Unprofitable and profitable corporations can enter into a
transaction called a lease solely to transfer certain tax benefits to the
unprofitable company.88 The typical safe harbor lease under this provision worked as follows: 1) corporation A purchases eligible equipment, obtaining the right to depreciation deductions and investment
credits, but incurs insufficient income tax liability to absorb the tax
benefits; 2) corporation A "sells" the equipment, together with the associated depreciation deductions and investment credits, to B, a profita-

ble and eligible corporation that can decrease its tax liability with the
84. For a recent review of the commercial advantages resulting when a transaction is characterized as a sale and leaseback, rather than as a loan, see Del Cotto, Sale andLeaseback."A Hollow
Sound When Tapped?, 37 TAX L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1981).
85. See the Revenue Procedures cited supra in note 81. Prior to the ERTA, users of the saleleaseback technique faced administrative suspicion and judicial uncertainty. The Service took the
position in its ExaminationTax SheltersHandbook that its agents should closely examine sale and
leaseback transactions because of their potential for tax avoidance. See CCH Internal Revenue
Manual, Audit Volume 1,MT 4236-1. After the Supreme Court's decision in Lyon, the judicial
..economic reality test" offered taxpayers little certainty in predicting whether a court would label
a particular transaction a sale and leaseback or a financing device. See Del Cotto, supra note 84,
at 40-45.
86. Under the safe harbor provisions, a transaction qualifies as a lease if(l) all parties elect to
treat the agreement as a lease; (2) the lessor is (a) a corporation other than a subchapter S corporation or a personal holding company, (b) a partnership, all of whose members are eligible corporations, or (c) a grantor trust where the grantor and the beneficiaries are all eligible corporations;
(3) the lessor has a minimum at-risk investment of 10% of the adjusted basis of the property;
(4) the lease term does not exceed a certain period; and (5) the property is "qualified leased property." See I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1982); see also JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION
OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 103-04.
87. I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(C) (West Supp. 1982). The legislative history spells out the factors previously established by the Service that Congress intended to be ignored. Previously, the Service
inquired whether (1) tax savings alone made the transaction economically viable; (2) the lessee
was, under local law, the owner of the property; (3) at the end of the lease, only the lessee would
find the property commercially usable; (4) the agreement provided that the property might, or
must, be bought or sold at the end of the lease at a fixed or determinable price, or provided for an
upward or downward rental adjustment to reflect the difference between the expected value of the
property at the end of the lease and its actual sales price; and (5) the lessee or a party related to the
lessee had provided direct financing, or had guaranteed financing for the transaction in an amount
up to 90% of the total investment. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38,
at 104.
88. The legislative history baldly states: "Because the leasing provision was intended to be
only a transferability provision, many of the transactions that would be characterized as a lease
under the safe harbor will have no business purpose (other than to transfer tax benefits)." Id.
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tax benefits; 3) as part of the negotiations between A and B, and in
exchange for the transfer of the property and the tax benefits, company

B agrees to "lease" the equipment back to A and to charge A lower
rental payments that reflect, and are made economically feasible by,

the lower tax liability enjoyed by corporation B as a result of the transferred tax benefits. Although B initially reaps the tax saving from the
depreciation deduction and investment credits, Congress intended the
bulk of the tax saving to be channeled back to A, the unprofitable company, through reduced rental payments for the equipment. The safe

harbor equipment lease constitutes the ninety-seventh Congress's creation of a de facto refundable credit. Unfortunately, the ninety-seventh
Congress offered this ingenious relief only to businesses using the cor89
porate form, and then only to established, widely held corporations.
In 1982, Congress cured this disparity, but the cure was negative

rather than positive. Although Congress apparently recognized the
benefits of the safe harbor leasing system of transferability, the political
pressures arising from public perceptions of the safe harbor rules 90 led
to their repeal. The TEFRA curtails the transfer of tax benefits from
ACRS deductions and the investment tax credit via artificial safe har-

bor leases by enacting several new restrictions and scheduling complete
repeal of the provisions for leases entered into after December 31,

1983.91 The investment tax credit-an important indirect government
subsidy-will once again benefit only those taxpayers who prosper,
generate profits, and incur sufficient tax liability to absorb the credit.
4. DecreasedRecapture of the Credit. Supporters of the investment credit have long objected to the complexity of its recapture provi-

sions and the length of time during which the exposure to recapture
89. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1982).
90. Perceptions of inequity arose from several factors: (1) safe-harbor leasing permits transactions entered into solely for tax reduction purposes; (2) safe-harbor leasing makes possible trafficking in tax benefits; (3) safe-harbor leasing allows large profitable corporations to purchase
sufficient tax benefits to eliminate current tax liability and simultaneously use carryover benefits
from prior years to obtain current refunds; (4) individuals cannot obtain safe-harbor leasing benefits; (5) safe-harbor leasing makes available a variety of tax benefits other than ACRS deductions;
and (6) safe-harbor leasing puts some corporations in a better position than repeal of the corporate
income tax would. Some critics have also cited safe-harbor leasing as an inefficient means of
achieving the desired transfer of tax expenditure benefits to those outside the income tax structure.
Obviously, unscrupulous lessors and other third parties have the opportunity to retain tax benefits
without offering the lessee reduced lease payments. Insofar as these intended benefits lie outside
the control of tax administrators, either refundability of tax revenue or direct government subsidies would offer more efficient means to achieve the same stimulus. See DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES, supra note 46, at 112-17.
91. See TEFRA § 209.
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persists. 92 Disposition of investment credit property before the expiration of an appropriate holding period causes credit recapture. 93 The
amount recaptured depends upon the length of time the taxpayer actually held the property prior to disposition.94 For example, before the
ERTA if a taxpayer acquired property with an estimated useful life of
at least seven years for a price of $18,000, he qualified for the full 10%
credit for seven-year property in the amount of $1,800. If the taxpayer
sold the property during year eight, he would have nothing to subject to
recapture because he would have held the property for the full sevenyear period. If, however, the taxpayer disposed of the property after
year three, he could keep only $600-the 33%credit appropriate for
property having a three-year useful life and held for three full years.
The excess $1200 would have to be recaptured from the original credit
by adding this amount back to his tax liability, without interest, in the
95
year he disposed of the property.
On the one hand, complexity arises because, for recapture purposes, a disposition occurs not only on sales and exchanges of the property but also in a variety of other situations, regardless of gain or loss.
Gifts, trade-ins, corporate distributions in liquidation, in-kind property
dividends, sales by a corporation in an otherwise tax-free liquidation
under section 337, and similar transactions are all dispositions.96 Recapture also occurs if the property ceases to be section 38 property; for
example, if the taxpayer converts it to personal use or to use outside of
the United States. 97 On the other hand, even though the taxpayer has
not held the property for the full investment credit holding period, re92. See, eg., Hearings on Investment Tax Credit, supra note 14, at 202, 205 (statement of
Professor Gerard Brannon), 225-26 (statement of Dale W. Wickham), 180-81 (statement of Je-

rome Kurtz, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, concerning special difficulties recapture
poses for Service).
93. For the recapture rules prior to the enactment of ERTA, see I.R.C. § 47(a)(1) (1976).
94. Id.
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1A7-1(a) (1967).

96. The statute mandates recapture if the property "is disposed of, or otherwise ceases
to be section 38 property with respect to the taxpayer before the close of the claimed investment
credit holding period." I.R.C. § 47(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added). See Treas. Reg. § 1.47(2)(a)(1)

(1967). In most corporate liquidations, the original taxpayer ceases to exist and recapture therefore occurs. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.

97. At the start of each taxable year during which the taxpayer must hold the property, the
taxpayer must redetermine whether the property qualifies as section 38 property. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.47-2(a)(2)(i) (1967). Property ceases to qualify, for example, if in a later year it is used
predominantly outside of the United States, see Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(g)(1)(i) (1964), or is converted from business to personal use, see Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(e) (1967). Although potential recap-

ture confronts a taxpayer annually, this is a one-sided arrangement: if property was not originally
eligible for the credit when the taxpayer placed it in service, he cannot subsequently benefit by
waiting for ineligible property to become eligible. Thus, if property was ineligible when placed in
service because predominantly used outside the United States, it does not become eligible for
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capture does not accompany a transfer of property on the death of the

individual owner,98 a corporate tax-free transfer, 99 or a transaction representing a "mere change in the form of conducting business."' 0 0

These various rules on what does or does not constitute a premature disposition giving rise to recapture have engendered continuing
dispute between taxpayers and the Service. 0 1 Those favoring a
credit in a later year even if permanently returned for use in the United States, see Treas. Reg. §
1.48(l)(g)(ii) (1964).
Destruction of section 38 property by casualty after April 18, 1969, does not require a recapture of credit, although a similar event occurring before that date did cause recapture. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.47-3(c) (1971).
98. See I.R.C. § 47(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(b)(1) (1967). Recapture
will occur if the taxpayer executes a pre-death gift despite the inclusion of the value of the gift in
the gross estate.
99. Recapture does not occur when, under section 381, section 38 assets are transferred in a
tax-free liquidation or reorganization. See I.R.C. § 47(b)(2) (West Supp. 1982). Section 381(a),
however, applies to liquidations of 80% owned subsidiaries only if the basis of the assets is carried
over under section 334(b)(1). For distributions occuring before September 1, 1982, if there is a
tax-free liquidation of an 80% owned subsidiary under section 334(b)(2) (no carryover of basis of
assets) recapture occurs. See Rev. Rul. 461, 1973-2 C.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 391, 1970-2 C.B. 3. The
TEFRA, however, repeals section 334(b)(2) and substitutes an election under section 338 by the
acquiring corporation to treat the acquired corporation ("target corporation") as if it sold all its
assets on the stock acquisition date. Thus, this new provision does not eliminate the recapture of
the investment credit attributable to the deemed sale of assets by the target corporation. See
TEFRA § 224(b).
100. Property does not lose its status as section 38 property because of a mere change in the
form of conducting the trade or business if the taxpayer retains a substantial interest in the trade
or business and uses the property in that enterprise. See I.R.C. § 47(b)(3) (West Supp. 1982). In
addition, the IRS requires that, to avoid recapture, the basis of the property in the hands of the
transferee be determined in whole or in part with reference to the property's basis in the hands of
the transferor, Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(t)(1)(ii)(d) (1967), and that "[s]ubstantially all the assets
(whether or not section 38 property) necessary to operate such trade or business are transferred to
the transferee to whom such section 38 property is transferred," Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(f)(1)(ii)(c)
(1967). Consequently, on incorporation of a going business, the taxpayer can avoid recapture only
if he transfers to the new business all of the section 38 assets and substantially all of the nonsection 38 operating assets necessary to conduct the new busines. See Rev. Rul. 514, 1976-2 C.B.
II (recapture of credit because transaction is not mere change in form when dentist, in tax-free
section 351 incorporation of dental practice, transferred to wholly owned corporation all his section 38 dental equipment, but retained and leased to corporation building used in dental practice).
The requirement that the transferor must retain an interest in the new corporation at least
equal to his prior interest must be met each year until the expiration of the investment credit
holding period. Thus, if his interest in a partnership were 5% and his interest in a newly formed
corporation remained 5%, no recapture occurs. If his interest in a later year should fall below 5%,
however, recapture would occur. See Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(f)(2), (5)(ii), (iv) (1967).
101. See, e.g., Long v. United States, 652 F.2d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'g 79-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 19612 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (recapture, not mere change in form, on liquidation of
subchapter S corporation although former shareholders continued to hold assets and operate same
business); Loewen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 90, 95 (1981) (no recapture, only change in form,
when farmers transferred section 38 property in tax-free section 351 incorporation although transfer of operating assets took the form of short-term oral leases); Ramm v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
671 (1979) (recapture, not mere change in form, on section 333 liquidation of a subchapter S
corporation); Hammerstrom v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 167, 180 (1973) (no recapture on change of
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strengthened investment tax credit allege that the uncertainty and complexity stemming from the recapture rules are counterproductive to the

effectiveness of the credit as a subsidy.' 02 They further claim that the
pre-1981 recapture rules-those that required the property to have a
useful life of at least seven years and then required the taxpayer to hold
that property for at least seven years in order to obtain the benefit of
the full 10% credit-discriminated against shorter-lived assets 0 3 and

discouraged replacement of obsolete business property held for less
than the required seven year period.1t

4

The ninety-seventh Congress responded to these criticisms by reducing the maximum period of exposure to recapture to five years for
five, ten, and fifteen-year recovery property, and to three years for
three-year recovery property. 0 5 In addition, if a disposition occurs
prior to the expiration of the full five-year period, only a pro rata portion of the credit remains subject to recapture. 0 6 Thus, on five-year
property, which produces either a 10% or an elective 8% credit, 20% of

the full credit is deemed earned during each year the taxpayer holds the
property. If the taxpayer disposes of five-year property without holding it the full five years, he can retain 20% of the initial credit for each
full year he holds the property. Thus, if he disposes of five-year recov-

ery property after he has held it a full two years, but less than three
40% of the original credit; 60% of the original credit
years, he can retain
10 7
is recaptured.

ownership from community property to tenancy in common); Priv. Let. Rul. 8,103,001, 1981 Fed.
Taxes: Priv. Let. Rul. (P-H) 186(81) (Jan. 23, 1981) (recapture, not mere change in form, where
taxpayer in nontaxable section 351 incorporation transferred all section 38 business assets to corporation but retained business building constituting 38% of operating business assets for lease to
corporation). But see Felgenhauer v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9532 (E.D.
Wash. 1981); Ostheller v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9531 (E.D. Wash. 1981)
(following Loewen, court determined that transfers of "substantially all" assets occurred on section 351 incorporation thereby constituting change in form only and requiring no recapture).
102. See, e.g., Hearingson Investment Tax Credit, supra note 14, at 223, 266-7 (statements of
Dale W. Wickham and Robert T. Benz).
103. Id. at 206 (statement of Prof. Brannon). The Treasury proposal in 1974-to eliminate the
various useful life limitations and grant the full credit to all eligible property with a useful life of
at least 3 years-would have eliminated all recapture. See id. at 170 (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
104. Id. at 266-67 (statement of Robert T. Benz).
105. ERTA § 211(g), (codified at I.R.C. § 47(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982)).
106. I.R.C. § 47(a)(5)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1982).
107. For discussion of a TEFRA provision requiring an upward basis adjustment upon disposition of certain section 38 property previously adjusted under I.R.C. §48(q) (1976 & West Supp.
1982), see supra note 56. The amended provisions have decided economic advantages for qualified taxpayers. If, under prior law, a businessman purchased $100,000 of new equipment with a
five-year useful life, producing a credit of $6666, and if the equipment ceased to qualify after he
held it for less than three years, the businessman would have to recapture the entire $6666. Those
same facts would produce an initial elective credit of 8%or 8,000 and, on loss of eligibility during
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INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
INTRODUCTION OF AN

"AT-RISK"

CONCEPT TO THE

INVESTMENT TAx CREDIT

The achievements of the ERTA and the TEFRA in expanding the
value of the investment tax credit as a subsidy are manifold: extending
the credit to new types of property; enacting a simpler formula producing larger dollar benefits; 0 8 and subjecting a smaller share of the credit
to recapture should the taxpayer prematurely dispose of the property.
Against these advances must be balanced a fundamentally new restraint on the use of the credit: the "at-risk" concept. The at-risk concept of section 465 was not new to the Code in 1981; what is new is its
application to the investment credit. An examination of the at-risk
concept's statutory origins and rapid rise to popularity as a weapon of
choice against certain types of potential tax abuse can, therefore, aid in
understanding why its recent extension to the investment credit field is
not a satisfactory answer to problems of investment credit tax abuses.
A.

Origin of the ' 4t-Risk" Concept of Section 465. Abuses of Tax
Shelters.

For as long as the maximization of after-tax net income has constituted a fundamental objective of business enterprises, the American
taxpayer has sought to minimize his income tax expenses by obtaining
tax preferences that either recharacterize his gross receipts, defer recognition of taxable receipts, or directly eliminate tax liability. Taxpayers
often legitimately manipulate established principles of federal taxation
solely to obtain lucrative tax benefits that have no independent economic significance. Prior to 1976, for example, a taxpayer might "invest" in an activity in order to become entitled to allowable deductions
that created artificial tax losses. The taxpayer then used these losses to
offset-and thereby shelter---other, unrelated taxable income. 10 9
Professor Bittker has noted that the success of tax shelters stems
largely from a basic structural element of the federal income tax system. Under the "global" approach of the rules of federal taxation, a
taxpayer generally must aggregate all income as well as all deducyear three (after the businessman had held the property more than two years), the taxpayer could
retain 40%, or $3,200, of the original credit and recapture only $4,800. Current law would produce

for him a permanent tax saving of $3,200 over prior law.
108. The ERTA's experimentation with a technique to grant economic advantages equivalent

to the credit to certain corporations that could not absorb a benefit structured as a tax credit also
represented a substantial, though fleeting, benefit.
109. For a discussion of pre-1976 abuses, see Wiesner, Tax Shelters-4 Survey of the Impact of
the Tax Reform4ct of 1976, 33 TAX L. REv. 5, 7-39 (1977).
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tions.l1° This aggregation approach permits deductions allowed for investment expenses both to reduce the income derived from the
investment and, if excess deductions exist, to spill over and reduce inI the
come derived from other sources. Although exceptions do exist, 11
deducand
of
income
mismatching
permits
essentially
global approach
tions, allowing an investor to shelter from taxation his otherwise currently taxable, high bracket income.
Prior to 1976 the most effective sheltering of income stemmed
from the use of leveraged financing. By investing funds composed
largely of borrowed money, a taxpayer could contribute a relatively
nominal amount of his personal assets to an investment and still generate full tax benefits. The basis rules of the Code allowed the taxpayer
to include the full amount of the indebtedness in his depreciation basis."12 Because any losses derived from an investment purchased with
leveraged financing frequently exceeded the taxpayer's actual personal
commitment, these losses arguably possessed no independent economic
significance. The taxpayer, in effect, purchased artificial tax losses to
spill over deductions to shelter unrelated income. Significantly, the
benefits of leveraged financing accrued to the borrower of investment
funds whether or not he assumed personal liability for the repayment
of the funds.
The Supreme Court, in Crane v. Commissioner," 3 held that a taxpayer's depreciation basis in an investment or activity included the
principal amount of any nonrecourse indebtedness secured only by the
property purchased with the loan proceeds. The taxpayer in Crane inherited, operated, and eventually sold an apartment complex subject to
a nonrecourse mortgage. She contended that because neither she nor
the unrelated vendee assumed the mortgage, her amount realized was
110. See generally B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
25.10.1, at 25-40 (1981). Prior to 1976, taxpayers could shelter their high bracket salaries or
professional fees with excess deductions derived from investments in a wide variety of ventures:
railroad boxcars, secondhand computers, lithographs, video tapes, Mexican vegetables,
and virtually anything else could serve as an investment vehicle, provided it crammed an
abnormal amount of deductions into the first year or two of the taxpayer's participation,
usually by taking advantage of statutory provisions for the write-off or rapid depreciation or amortization of capital outlays.

Id.
I 1. Several specific exceptions limit the concept of "global" net income. For example, the tax
laws segregate items of capital gains and losses and tax them differently from other income and
expenses. See I.R.C. §§ 1201-1223 (West Supp. 1982). Moreover, certain "tainted" activities generate allowable deductions only up to an amount equal to the income they produce. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 165(d) (wagering), § 183 (hobbies), § 280A (vacation home rentals).
112. See I.R.C. §§ 1012-1019 (West Supp. 1982).
113. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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only the net amount of cash that she received. 14 The IRS countered
with the argument that the value of the property Crane inherited and
l5
sold was greater than her equity in the apartment building and lot."
The value of the property, according to the Service, was the fair market
value of the lot and apartment building undiminished by the principal
amount of the mortgage indebtedness." 6 Crane, however, urged the
Court to equate the meaning of the term "property," as used in the
7
taxing statute, with the accumulated equity in the physical asset."
The Court rejected Crane's approach and, instead, defined property as
the actual physical asset over which the taxpayer exercised her ownership rights. 18 In so holding, the Crane Court established a rule that,
for purposes of computing gain, a taxpayer must include the principal
amounts of both personal obligations and nonrecourse indebtedness in
the basis of his property.
By according uniform treatment to both recourse and nonrecourse
liabilities, however, the Crane Court "laid the foundation stone of most
tax shelters.""t 9 Judicial development of the Crane rationale eventually allowed the taxpayer to depreciate property from a basis in excess
of the taxpayer's actual economic investment in the property. The
Service attempted to limit the Crane holding, applying it only when the
taxpayer inherited property subject to an unassumed mortgage, but the
courts unwaveringly followed the broader Crane rationale. 20 Eventu114. Id.at 3-4.

115. Id.at 4-5.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 3.
118. Id. at 10-11. Sound economic rationale supports the judicial equation of assumption of
debt, in a purchase-sale situation, with payment of money. In a credit oriented economy, different
treatment of these financing techniques would favor the tax-wise investor blessed with deep cash
pockets. Consider, for example, taxpayer A who purchases a building with $100,000 cash and
taxpayer B who purchases the same building by personally assuming a $100,000 mortgage on the
building. In view of the various holdings of the Supreme Court, both A and B have a basis of
$100,000 in the building for depreciation purposes (under old section 167(g) and new section 168)
and the seller in each instance has realized $100,000 for purposes of section 1011. If the assumption of the mortgage by B were not treated as the equivalent of money, and had Mrs. Crane
prevailed, B would have had a zero basis in the property and no amount to depreciate.
119. Bittker, Tax Shelters, NonrecourseDebt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277, 283

(1978).
120. The Tax Court, for example, in Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973), acq. 1976-1
C.B. 1, held that a taxpayer acquired a depreciable basis, equal to the full purchase price, in
certain property even though he assumed no personal liability for any mortgage indebtedness. In
Bolger the taxpayer ordinarily invested by (1) forming a nominally capitalized "financing corporation;" (2) causing it to purchase commercial real property that a commercial user desired to
lease; (3) causing the corporation to enter into a net lease with the user, and (4) causing the corporation to sell its negotiable corporate notes, secured by mortgages on the leased property, to an
institutional lender pursuant to a note purchase agreement. The taxpayer then purchased the
property from the corporation for a nominal consideration, without assuming any personal liabil-
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ally the taxpayer could include in the basis of acquired property the
principal amount of any purchase-money indebtedness or the full market value of property subject to indebtedness regardless of the taxpayer's personal liability to repay the borrowed funds. By making only
a nominal out-of-pocket investment in a venture, taxpayers who sought
to shelter unrelated income could generate artificially high amounts of
allowable deductions, as well as spill-over losses.
The classic tax shelter investment after Crane involved three beneficial elements for a taxpayer: (1) deferral of taxable gain; (2) conversion of ordinary income into capital gain; and (3) leverage, particularly
leverage without the taxpayer's personal liability to repay the borrowed
funds. 12 ' In 1976, Congress enacted section 465 to attack only the third
element, the use of leverage. 122 Congress correctly focused on leverage
because the use of indebtedness-whether recourse or nonrecourse-to
leverage a taxpayer's investment permits him to realize more tax benefits than would be possible if he personally financed the entire venture.
The taxpayer, for example, may deduct allowances for depreciation
and other noncash expenses that often greatly exceed his personal investment and that are more than sufficient in amount to defer the venture's tax liabilities. In response to such situations, section 465 simply
restricts the spill-over of certain deductions in excess of the income derived from the venture and thereby prevents the sheltering of unrelated
income. Under section 465, only losses incurred in an activity in which
the taxpayer risks a genuine economic investment may be used to shelity. The Commissioner sought to deny the taxpayer any depreciation deductions on the property,
but the court held that the taxpayer's depreciable basis equalled the full purchase price even
though the taxpayer had no personal liability for the mortgage indebtedness. In holding for the
taxpayer, the Tax Court relied principally on the Crane decision and its own decision in Mayerson
v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21, which had reaffirmed the Crane theory
that basis of depreciable property should include the amount of any unassumed mortgage on the
property. See also Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949) (depreciable basis
of property includes full amount of unassumed outstanding tax liens and penalties).
The judicial decision that comes closest to questioning the Crane doctrine is Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752 (1975), af'd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). The Tax Court
faced contrived real estate transactions in which the taxpayer computed depreciable basis on the
sum of his cash investment and his allocable portion of a partnership's nonrecourse debt. The
court held that, because of its indefinite and unconditonal nature, the partnership's indebtedness
was not includable in the basis of the property. The court, however, distinguished Crane,Mayerson, and Bolger by focusing on the transaction's lack of economic substance. Because the transaction's "purported initial sales price" was unrelated to the fair market value of the property, the
possibility of overvaluation of the property clearly influenced the court's analysis. See id. at 771.
121. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27 (1975); Schapiro, Limitation ofLosses
to Amount at Risk, in TAX SHELTERS AFTER TAX REFORM I (R. Schapiro, ed. 1977).
122. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204,90 Stat. 1520, 1531 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 465 (1976 & West Supp. 1982)).
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ter otherwise taxable unrelated income.' 23 Thus, under section 465 the
taxpayer's "amount-at-risk" (AAR) in a venture limits the amount of
losses that may offset and shelter income derived from an unrelated
venture.
B. Extension of the 't-Risk"

Concept to Section 46(c)(8): Potential

for Additional Abuse.
Since its enactment in 1962, the investment tax credit has provided
opportunities for manipulation equal to those provided in the traditional Crane-derivedshelter. Cost recovery allowances (depreciation) and
investment credits are both important as incentives for government-favored activities. Congress has frequently considered the concepts in
tandem when analyzing the economic impact of alternative revisions of
its fiscal policy.124 Participants in tax-shelter schemes, moreover, draw
little distinction between different forms of tax benefits when net tax
reduction is their prime reason for involvement. Clearly, by continuing
to overlook the shelter potential of a tax credit, the ninety-seventh Congress would have again illustrated an unfortunate tendency toward
"form over substance."
In enacting the investment credit revisions of the ERTA, however,
Congress focused on more than just those evils traditionally associated
with nonrecourse leveraged financing; it also clearly recognized and
sought to attack the problem of overvaluation of property acquired to
obtain an inflated investment credit.' 25 Prior to the ERTA, according
to comments in its legislative history, 26 an unscrupulous purchaser of
eligible prrperty worth only twenty dollars could agree to pay the seller
of the property its real worth in cash and to encumber the property
123. See B. BITTKER, supra note 99, 1 25.10.3.
Section 465 is not the only tax shelter weapon used by the Service. Section 6659, for example,
provides substantial penalties for the over-valuation of assets, formerly possible by the use of nonrecourse financing. See I.R.C. § 6659 (1976 & West Supp. 1982). The Code provides civil and
criminal penalties for offenses related to the willful failure to pay taxes or for any attempt to evade
or defeat any tax imposed by the Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (1976). In addition, the Service
has issued Revenue Rulings that accurately attack abusive tax shelters. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69,
1980-1 C.B. 55 (charitable deduction allowable to extent of fair market value of contributed property rather than an artificially calculated estimate of value); Rev. Rul. 73, 1980-1 C.B. 128
(amount of nonrecourse notes payable only to the extent of proceeds received from sale of minerals held nondeductible as advance mineral royalties); Rev. Rul. 74, 1980-1 C.B. 137 (formation of
foreign trust by American citizen held sham transaction thereby disallowing trust expenses).
124. See, e.g., TEFRA, supra note 2, at 481-82 (reenactment of basis adjustment feature coupling ACRS and investment credit benefits); see also supra note 15.
125. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSED DEPRECIATION AND INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT REVISIONS PART III: ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC IssuEs 52

(Comm. Print 1981).
126. Id.
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with a nonrecourse note for eighty dollars. The seller "ideally" would
accept the original twenty-dollar cash "downpayment" and disregard,
under an installment sales privilege, the eighty-dollar nonrecourse indebtedness until receipt.' 27 Payment of the debt might constitute an
unexpected taxable windfall, but default certainly would not economically injure the seller. Under the fully evolved Crane doctrine, 128 the

purchaser could include in the basis of the property the twenty dollars
cash as well as the meaningless eighty-doilar nonrecourse liability and
benefit by receiving depreciation and investment credit allowances
computed on an inflated hundred-dollar basis. Obviously the sole purpose of this nonrecourse indebtedness was to generate an apparent
purchase price of one hundred dollars rather than twenty dollars and
thus artificially inflate depreciation and investment credit allowances.
Faced with stern Treasury reaction to the possibility of such unconscionable gamerings of government subsidies, 29 Congress took action to limit such abuse. As part of the ERTA, it incorporated by
broad reference the section 465 at-risk restrictions on losses into the
new investment credit provisions. 30 Section 46(c)(8) thus generally denies the investment credit subsidy for otherwise eligible property that a
taxpayer acquires with funds borrowed on a nonrecourse basis.
III.

COMPARING THE OPERATION OF AT-RISK LIMITATIONS UNDER

SECTION

465 AND UNDER SECTION 46(c)(8)

The incorporation of any anti-abuse provision into a tax incentive
program such as the investment credit will inevitably cause some foreseeable technical problems. But unexpected discrepancies as well are
beginning to surface in the application of the at-risk test derived from
section 465. The most striking problem arises because the ninety-seventh Congress apparently accepted the position of the Treasury that the
use of nonrecourse financing in the acquisition of section 38 property
should usually operate per se to deprive a taxpayer of the privilege of
the investment credit. Thus, section 46(c)(8) initially denies any investment credit to a taxpayer for property purchased with borrowed funds
that the taxpayer is not personally obligated to repay, even though section 465, the parent provision of the at-risk concept, generally does not
127. See I.R.C. § 453 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 113-19.
129. See, e.g., Hearingson Investment Tax Credit, supra note 14, at 18 1-82 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service); 55 J. TAX'N 389 (1981) (remarks by Commissioner Egger before Heart of America Tax Institute in Kansas City).
130. ERTA § 211(0, (codified at I.R.C. § 46(c)(8) (West Supp. 1982)).
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deny deductions for expenses in the same venture to the same taxpayer
using the same nonrecourse financing.
A.

Taxpayers Subject to the At-Risk Test.

With two exceptions, all taxpayers must face the at-risk tests under
both section 46(c)(8) and section 465 of the Code regardless of the nature of their business or their investment. The exceptions, however, are

major: the first is based on the legal structure of the taxpayer, and the
second is based on the activities the taxpayer engages in. First, Con-

gress granted immunity from at-risk requirements to any corporation
that is not closely held, regardless of the nature of its business or investment activities. The Code does not expressly provide this immunity for
publicly held corporations, but it necessarily confers it by not including
them within the ambit of section 465(a)(1),' 3 ' and thus not within section 46(c)(8). Section 465(a)(1) covers individuals, subchapter S corporations, and, since 1978, certain closely-held corporations.

32

The closely-held corporations that automatically fall within the
net of section 465, and therefore within the at-risk restrictions of the
investment credit, are those that meet the stock ownership threshold

requirements for personal holding company status. 33 If a corporation
is held through such stock ownership, it faces the at-risk requirements
even though it may, in fact, operate as a legitimate active business
rather than as a personal holding company. Under these rules, if five
or fewer individuals directly or indirectly own more than fifty percent
of the value of the corporation's stock during the last half of its taxable

year, the corporation is subject to the at-risk requirements.134 If less

131. The limitation of the investment credit to the amount at risk applies only to taxpayers
"described in section 465(a)(i)." I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1982).
132. Under I.R.C. section 641(b) an estate or trust receives the same tax treatment as does an
individual. Professor Bittker has commented that the 1978 extension of the at-risk provisions to
closely held corporations was "an innovation in the jurisdictional reach of provisions designed to
curb tax avoidance." See BITTKER, supra note 110, at 25-43.
133. These requirements are established in section 542(a) and invoked by section 465(a)(I)(C).
134. I.R.C. section 544 (1976) now determines the attribution rules for stock ownership under
section 542. Until 1978, the attribution rules of section 318 applied to the constructive ownership
of the stock under section 542(a)(2) in determining whether the corporation was subject to section
465. Congress decided in 1980 that the section 318 attribution rules were too narrow for purposes
of section 465 in several respects. For example, under section 318, an individual is deemed to own
only the stock of his spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents. In contrast, under section 544,
an individual is deemed to own the stock owned by his spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and
brothers and sisters. Under section 318, the stock of a subsidiary corporation is deemed owned by
a shareholder of a parent corporation only if that shareholder owns 50% or more in value of the
stock of the parent. By contrast, under section 544, stock in a subsidiary owned by a parent
corporation is attributed to all of the shareholders of the parent in proportion to each shareholder's stock ownership of the parent. Congress determined that the section 318 attribution rules
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than ten individuals own all the stock of a corporation, the corporation
is automatically subject to the at-risk requirements because five or
fewer stockholders will unavoidably own more than fifty percent of the
stock. If ten or more individuals own all the stock, or if the stockholders include trusts, estates, partnerships or other corporations, then the
personal holding company attribution rules 35 must be explored to determine if the stock-although owned of record by various apparently
unrelated stockholders-might be imputed to one or more stockholders
under the constructive ownership rules applicable to personal holding
companies. 36 Thus, because of the enactment of the ERTA closelyheld corporations that conduct active businesses, and that have never
previously faced personal holding company stock ownership rules, may
have to examine these rules before acquiring eligible section 38 property. At the other end of the spectrum, publicly held corporations will,
in all likelihood, escape the personal holding company stock ownership
test and operate free of the at-risk restrictions.
The second exemption from the at-risk restrictions involves two
specific taxpayer activities. The at-risk provisions of the Code impose
no limitations on taxpayers, regardless of legal structure, engaged in
"the holding of real property (other than mineral property),' 37 nor on
closely-held corporations engaged in certain qualified equipment
leasing.' 38
could inadvertently exempt from the at-risk limitations of section 465 a corporation that would in
fact be a personal holding company if the strict attribution rules of section 544 were applied, but
would not be a personal holding company under section 318 attribution rules. Congress also
noted that under section 318, stock of a subsidiary, even though wholly owned, would not be
considered more than 50% owned by five or fewer individuals under the personal holding company stock ownership test if no individual was considered to own 50% or more of the stock of the
parent corporation. In order to include such corporations within the scope of section 465, Congress replaced the attribution rules of section 318 with those of section 544 for all purposes of
section 465 with one exception: the section 544 attribution rules between partners-attributing
stock of a corporation owned by one partner to another partner--do not apply under section 465.
See S.REP. No. 498, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
316, 353-54.
135. See generaly Treas. Reg. § 1.544-1, T.D. 6739, 1964 2 C.B. 156.
136. See I.R.C. § 544(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
137. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1980). This section treats personal property and services
that may be incidental to making real property usable as living accommodations as part of the

exempt real estate activity. For example, owning and operating a hotel qualifies as an exempt real
estate activity free from the at-risk restrictions of section 465. One caveat exists: the real estate
exclusion does not apply to taxpayers holding real estate in any of the five objectionable activities
enumerated in section 465(c)(1). See infra notes 139-41 and accompaning text.
138. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). "Equipment leasing" includes the leasing,
purchasing, servicing, and selling of section 1245 property, such as computers (including computer
software); transportation equipment (airplanes, automobiles, tractors, and railroad cars); copiers
and calculators; heavy equipment like cranes; furniture; and similar property. I.R.C.
§ 465(c)(6)(A), (B) (Supp IV 1980). The statute is not intended to include master sound recording
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B. Activities Covered by Section 465 At-Risk Provisions.

Categorization by taxpayer activity provides one current format
for the limited exceptions to the at-risk requirements described above.
It also serves as the historical format of section 465. Section 465 origi-

nally affected only taxpayers engaged

39

in one of five specifically enu-

merated objectionable activities: 1) holding, producing or distributing

motion picture films or videotapes; 2) farming; 40 3) leasing certain section 1245 property; 4) exploring for or exploiting oil and gas resources;
and 5) exploring for or exploiting geothermal deposits.' 4' Although
Congress enacted section 465 in 1976 as a narrowly aimed anti-tax shelter device,' 42 within two short years Congress reversed this situation

and applied the section generally to all activities-whether or not statutorily enumerated-conducted by any covered taxpayer in any trade,

business, or investment for the production of income. 143 The only exceptions are for real estate holdings and certain equipment leasing.

44

Despite this broad potential scope, section 465 actually has a narrow operative thrust. The at-risk limitations themselves operate within

45
the framework of separate "activities," a word which is a term of art. 1

Section 465 has no operative effect when a taxpayer engages in only
one activity. The section does come into play when a taxpayer attempts

to apply a net loss from one activity as a deduction against income
leases and other contracts relating to literary, artistic or musical properties, such as books, lithographs of works of art, and musical tapes. See JOINT COMMITrEE EXPLANATION OF 1978 ACT,
supra note 40, at 135. An equipment leasing corporation must also meet certain additional tests in
order to qualify for this exception from the at-risk restrictions. For a general discussion of the
evolution of this portion of section 465, see S. REP. No. 498, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 316, 355-56.

139. The activity is "engaged" in when it is undertaken for the production of income, or as a
trade or business, not a hobby. I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (1976).
140. The Code broadly defines the objectionable activity of "farming" as "the cultivation of
land or the raising or harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity including the
raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training, and management of animals." I.R.C. § 464(e)
(1976). The raising of fruit-bearing and nut-bearing trees is within the suspect activity. Other
trees, however, are not agricultural or horticultural commodities, and, therefore, are outside the
definition of "farming." Id
141. For explicit development of the definition of this activity, see I.R.C. § 613(e)(3) (Supp. IV
1980).
142. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204, 90 Stat. 1520, 1531 (codified in
scattered sections of I.R.C.).
143. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 201, 92 Stat. 2763, 2814 (codified in scattered
sections of I.R.C.).
144. Although the holding of real property need not meet the at-risk limitations of section 465,
this exclusion does not operate for real property held as an integral part of any one of the five
activities specified in section 465(c)(I); it applies only to real property held in one of the nonspecifled activities referred to in section 465(c)(3)(A). See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1980) (introductory clause).
145. See B. BiTTKER, supra note 110, T25.10.2; see also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-1 (1979).
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derived from other activities. Section 465 allows this net loss to shelter
income derived from other activities only in an amount equal to the
taxpayer's at-risk investment in the loss-producing activity.t 46 Deductible expenses incurred in a single activity are fully allowed up to the
amount of income produced by that activity and any excess deductions-when that single activity constitutes a taxpayer's sole activitywill produce net losses that carry over to other taxable years without

concern with the amount the taxpayer
any section 465 ceiling or any
47

has at risk in that activity.'
Because section 465 operates only when excess deductions from
one activity are used as deductions to offset income of another activity,
the applicability of the section's rules turns, in part, on the existence of
a "separate activity" and whether a series of business or investment
transactions will be viewed as a "separate activity." Congress originally
specified that each of the activities listed in section 465(c)(1) constitutes
a separate activity.' 4 8 Thus, section 465 treats each film or videotape,
each leased section 465 property, each farm, each oil and gas property,
and each geothermal property as a separate activity. When the Revenue Act of 1978 extended the scope of section 465 to "each activity"
conducted by a taxpayer in carrying on a trade or business or for the
production of income, 149 however, Congress did not prescribe new
guidelines to separate one activity from another under the added
coverage.

The consequences of separate activity treatment are often significant. For example, if a taxpayer owns two ice cream parlors-one operating unprofitably in a downtown area and one operating at a profit
146. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1A65-2 (1979).
If a taxpayer invests $15,000 cash and $85,000 for which he is not at risk in a covered activity,
his amount at risk would equal only $15,000. Assume that, during the taxable year, the covered
activity (one of several investment activities) produces income of $20,000 and otherwise allowable
deductions of $45,000. The taxpayer's loss attributable to that activity equals $25,000: $45,000 of
deductions offset by $20,000 of income earned by the activity. To the extent that the taxpayer
wishes to use the $25,000 loss-referred to as the section 465(d) loss, see Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 4.465-1 l(a)(2) (1979)-against income derived from his other activities, the section 465 limitation comes into play. If, at year's end, the amount the taxpayer has at risk remains only $15,000
the taxpayer may utilize only $15,000 of the $25,000 section 465(d) loss as a deduction against his
income from other activities. The remaining $10,000 of the loss is not allowable as a deduction in
the same taxable year because it exceeds the amount at risk. It is, however, treated as a deduction
allocable to the original activity for the next succeeding years. See I.R.C. § 465(a)(2) (Supp. IV
1980); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-I l(a)(2).
147. Thus, even if a taxpayer has nothing at risk in an activity, otherwise allowable deductions
of $20,000 allocable to the activity, and $15,000 of income from the activity, a full $15,000 deduction will be allowed. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-11 (c) (1979).
148. I.R.C. § 465(c)(2) (1976).
149. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-600, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2814 (codified at
I.R.C. § 465(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980)).
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in the suburbs-and if the operation of the two stores constitutes a single activity, he could apply the excess deductions from the downtown
parlor against the income derived from the suburban parlor regardless
of whether he had any amount at risk in either location. Under section
465, the taxpayer has not actually spilled over any excess deductions
from the aggregated ice cream parlor activity to another separate activity. If each parlor were viewed as a separate activity, however, excess
deductions from the downtown parlor could shelter income derived
from the suburban operation only in an amount equal to the taxpayer's
at-risk investment in the downtown parlor's activity.
The separate activity approach of section 465 represents a departure from established canons of taxation. The Code ordinarily aggregates income from all sources and allows deductions and credits against
this amalgamated whole. Without doubt, manipulation of the system
by those claiming excessive artificial deductions justifies the separate
activity treatment of section 465. However, because the separate activity approach represents an exception to the norm and imposes special
burdens on taxpayers and the IRS alike, Congress only cautiously expanded the concept when it extended the general scope of section 465.
Favoring the taxpayer, Congress established a presumption that those
activities-newly covered in 1978 by section 465-constituting a taxpayer's bona fide trade or business, as distinguished from an investment, are deemed a single aggregated activity, as long as the taxpayer
actively participates in the management of that trade or business. 50
Thus the ice cream parlor owner could treat his two stores as a single
aggregate activity under section 465 if he actively participates in the
management of both stores. Even if the aggregate deductions exceed
the aggregate income of the presumed single umbrella activity, the atrisk restrictions of section 465 do not come into play when the taxpayer
does not use the excess deductions to shelter unrelated income derived
5
from another activity.' 1
150. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1982); JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF 1978
ACT, supra note 40, at 131.
151. Although Congress designed the aggregation of activities rule to provide adequate protection for taxpayers who actively participate in the management of a trade or business, this concept has proved deficient in several respects. First, the aggregation rule applies only to nonenumerated activities within a single trade or business. A taxpayer may not aggregate activities of
different trades or businesses even though he actively participates in the management and operation of both businesses. Thus the owner of a group of ice cream parlors may not aggregate his ice
cream activities with a retail clothing business even though he is an active participant in both.
Second, the aggregation rule offers no relief to the active participant in a bona-fide trade or business who realizes losses from the legitimate business endeavor but derives income from other
sources. An owner of two ice cream parlors may offset income derived from other sources only
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The determination of whether a taxpayer actively participates in

the operation or management of a trade or business will vary with the
circumstances. I5 2 The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1978
mentions various factors, both positive and negative, which should be
considered. 53 Congress also gave the Secretary of the Treasury discretion to prescribe regulations under section 465 containing more specific
standards by which one trade or business activity might be segregated
into separate activities, or under which several activities might be aggregated into one activity for loss purposes. 5 4 The House Report,
however, indicates that Congress assumed that tax shelters are more

likely to take the form of a passive investment than that of an active
trade or business.

55

In the absence of regulations, therefore, section

465 presumes that each investment constitutes a separate activity. 156
Investments cannot be aggregated, and excess deductions from one investment activity can reduce income derived from any other source

only up to the amount the taxpayer has at risk in that isolated investment activity.
C.

The Amount At Riskfor the Investment Credit Is MeasuredNot
By Activity, But By Property.

The ninety-seventh Congress incorporated the at-risk limitations
into the investment credit area by express cross-reference to section

465. These new at-risk rules apply to section 38 property "used in conwith the ice cream losses that do not exceed his amount at risk in the ice cream business, even
though he spends most of his time managing and operating a bona-fide ice cream business.
152. When a partnership or subchapter S corporation carries on a trade or business in one of
the non-enumerated activities, the key test in order to determine if several activities constitute one
trade or business activity is whether at least 65% of the losses of the entity in the taxable year are
allocable to persons actively participating in the management of the trade or business. See JOINT
COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF 1978 ACT, supra note 40, at 131.
153. Evidence of active taxpayer management includes "participating in the decisions involving the operation or management of the trade or business, actually performing services for the
trade or business, or hiring and discharging employees (as compared to only the person who was
the manager of the trade or business)." Id. Factors indicating a non-active role include "lack of
involvement in management and operation of the trade or business, having authority only to
discharge the manager of the trade or business, or having a manager of the trade or business who
is an independent contractor rather than an employee." Id.
154. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(C) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Secretary has not to date exercised his discretion to alter the statutory presumption that an actively managed trade or business
constitutes one section 465 activity. The proposed regulations, for example, state that the term
"activity," unless expressly provided otherwise, refers only to an activity that is one of the five tax
shelter activities enumerated in the Code and that, unless otherwise stated, "it is assumed that an
entity conducting an activity is engaged only in that one activity." Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.4659(c), (d), FED. TAXES (P-H) S 20,648.39 (1979).
155. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF 1978 ACT, supra note 40, at 132.
156. See H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1978).
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nection with an activity with respect to which any loss is subject to limitation under section 465."157 Accordingly, the basis of affected section
ordinarily uses to compute the taxpayer's
38 property, which the Code
"qualified investment,"' 5 8 generally "shall not exceed the amount the
taxpayer is at-risk with respect to such property as of the close of the
taxable year."' 59 By limiting the "qualified investment" to the taxpayer's amount-at-risk, the new rules effectively limit the available
credit.
In some aspects, both of the Code's at-risk provisions operate similarly. The same taxpayers are subject to the at-risk concept under both
section 465 and the investment credit area. The section 465 exception
for widely-held corporations, as distinguished from closely-held corpo0 Finally, taxpayers
rations, also applies in the investment credit area. 16
who engage in exempt activities as defined in section 465 can acquire
section 38 property and obtain a credit therefor without the burden of
the new at-risk limitations in the investment tax credit section.
The new at-risk investment credit limitation, however, differs
markedly from section 465 in structure and causes adverse tax consequences even for a single-activity taxpayer. Although section
46(c)(8)(B) states that "at-risk" has the same meaning for investment
credit purposes as it has in section 465, section 465 is loss and activity
oriented, coming into play only when certain excess deductions occur.
The investment credit provisions, on the other hand, are property-oriented, operating to deny the investment credit even when no loss occurs. The new at-risk basis limitation applies if a taxpayer uses section
38 property in an activity in which, had the activity actually generated
a loss, the loss would have been "subject to limitation under section
465."161 Even when the taxpayer's affected activities operate at a handsome profit and do not produce excess deductions that would be subject
to section 465 limitation, the lack of at-risk investment in acquired
property generally denies him an otherwise appropriate credit. This
denial occurs even on acquisition of investment property by the most
legitimate of businesses for an activity lacking any characteristics of tax
shelter abuse.
Thus, section 46(c)(8), in effect, operates to deny the credit to the
taxpayer based on the taxpayer's initial financing arrangements for eligible property. The legislative history corroborates this conclusion by
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(A) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1982).
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stating that "[t]he investment credit is not allowed for amounts invested
in qualifying property to the extent the invested amounts are not atrisk."' 162 The Senate Report notes that "amounts at-risk with respect to
qualifying property are only those amounts considered at risk under
section 465 that are directly attributable to investment in the property."' 63 Thus, if the taxpayer contributes cash to an operating account
of his business that would, under section 465, be considered an at-risk
investment in the business, that same cash would, under section
46(c)(8), fail to qualify as an at-risk investment in section 38 property.64 The theoretical imperfection of the extension of the at-risk concept, however, lies not so much in section 46(c)(8)'s preoccupation with
the amount at-risk in the property, but rather in its failure to parallel
the two-stage pattern of section 465. By denying the investment credit
at the outset, the new rules gloss over the two-stage distinction carefully
developed during the evolution of section 465. At the first stage, section
465 allows deductions in an originating activity up to the amount of the
income derived from that activity regardless of the taxpayer's amount
at risk. The second stage allows the transfer of excess deductions from
the originating activity to reduce income derived from another separate
activity only up to the taxpayer's amount-at-risk in the originating
activity.
The ice cream parlor enterprise that was never intended as a tax
shelter vividly illustrates the disparate results of the activity approach
of section 465 as compared to the property approach of section 46(c)(8).
Section 465 allows the taxpayer to aggregate his entire ice cream business into one activity, so long as he actively participates in its management. 165 Consequently, he could not only benefit from the ordinary
"first stage" deductions, which reduce the income of each respective
sub-activity (the individual parlors), but he could also use any excess
deductions freely throughout the entire ice cream operation regardless
of his amount-at-risk in any sub-activity. The property-by-property approach of section 46(c)(8) produces completely different tax consequences. Focusing on the nature of the financing used to acquire each
freezer, soda fountain, or other particular item of section 38 property,
and assuming a zero amount at risk, section 46(c)(8) would provide
neither a "first stage" investment credit available to reduce the tax liability of a particular sub-activity nor the benefits of an analogous, yet
property-oriented, aggregation concept. This severe curtailment of the
162. JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 96.
163. SENATE REPORT ON ERTA, supra note I, at 66 (emphasis added).
164. See id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 148-56.
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investment subsidy is difficult to understand, especially in light of the
parent provision's two-stage liberalization in 1978.166
With eligibility for the credit benefits turning solely on the nature
of the initial financing used to acquire the property, section 46(c)(8)
disregards both losses, the sine qua non for invoking the ceiling of section 465, and income. Several existing sections of the Code, which disallow only deductions in excess of an activity's income, suggest that
section 46(c)(8) is overly harsh and provide persuasive precedent for
adoption of a two-stage approach. For example, a taxpayer engaged in
a non-profit-making hobby may deduct all expenses of the hobby up to
an amount equal to the income it produces. 167 Objections stem not
from the first stage of deductions covered by the hobby income, but
from any second-stage attempt to carry hobby losses outside that activity to reduce income from other sources. A taxpayer raising parakeets
for the joy of it can exhaust all parakeet income with parakeet expenses
and pay no tax on the activity. Not so with the farmer who has taxable
farm income of $100,000, and buys a $25,000 tractor under a financing
arrangement that produces no at-risk investment in the tractor by section 46(c)(8) standards. Because there is no at-risk investment, the
farmer cannot realize a benefit by applying the investment credit
against his farm income tax.
Another example of a two-stage income ceiling is the limit on de168
ductions a taxpayer may take in connection with his vacation home.
If, for instance, the taxpayer uses the home as a residence and also rents
it to others, he can deduct those expenses properly allocable to the
69
rental activity, but only up to the amount of the year's rental income. 1
Only personal expenses are denied.' 70 The broad principle that tax
preferences are not inherently suspect, and should meet with no disallowances if applied only to the income of the activity originating the
preferences, is manifested again in the tax treatment of gamblers. Even
wagering losses are allowed to the extent of wagering income. 17 ' Why
should the farmer who buys a tractor fare more poorly than the
gambler?
The present investment credit at-risk restrictions, with their property-by-property approach, resemble but are even stricter than the original section 465, which focused on only five suspect tax abuse
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id.
See I.R.C. § 183 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b) (1976).
See I.R.C. § 280A (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See Proposed Treas. Reg. § I.280A-3, FED. TAXES (P-H)
See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-1, FED. TAXES (P-H)
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 165(d) (1976).

16,979.18-C (1980).
16,979.18-A (1980).
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activities.1 72 The section 465 regulations provided, for example, that if
a taxpayer holds, produces or distributes motion picture films, each
film represents a separate activity giving rise to a separate determination of the at-risk investment in that film.t73 Although the regulations
apply this approach to other enumerated tax abuse activities, such as
"leasing section 1245 property,"' 174 they also suggest possible modifications of the separate property approach. If, for instance, several section
1245 properties, such as parts of a computer system, constitute one unit
under the same lease, and are not separately financed or subject to different lease terms, the regulations aggregate the several properties for
t75
purposes of measuring at-risk investment.
The legislative history of section 46(c)(8), however, does not suggest aggregation of section 38 properties, even if acquired by a single,
legitimate, active business. Under the statutory structure, the volume
and complexity of the records required to manage separate individual
investments in eligible properties are awesome to contemplate. In view
of the role of the investment credit as a congressionally-endorsed subsidy, it is difficult to find a rationale for the per se denial of the investment credit solely on the basis of the initial financing of the section 38
property when that property is acquired in a non-tax-sheltering active
trade or business. 176 The denial seems even less rational when examined in light of the vagaries of the calculations used to decide the
amount-at-risk in a property.
172. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (1976).
173. See
174. See
incorporates
175. See

Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-42(c)(1), FED. TAXES (P-H)
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1A65-44(c)(1), FED. TAXES (P-H)
the rules of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-42(c), FED. TAXES
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-44(c)(2), FED. TAXES (P-H)

20,648.72 (1979).
20,648.74 (1979), which
(P-H) T 20,648.72 (1979).
20,648.74 (1979).

176. Section 46(c)(8)'s per se denial of an investment tax credit based solely on the use of
nonrecourse financing threatens the current importance of this type of financing. Individuals and

closely held corporations conducting only one trade or business-and consequently realizing income from only that trade or business-face a distinct disadvantage in competing with publicly

held companies. For example, under current economic conditions, many manufacturers of heavy
equipment offer special financing arrangements to increase sales. A small cash down payment
coupled with a nonrecourse note for the balance of the sales price, secured only by an interest in

the equipment, disqualifies the individual or closely held corporate purchaser from much of the
investment tax credit benefits. The purchaser could claim a credit for only part of the nominal

down payment, even though he uses the equipment in a profitable, bona-fide business that he
actively manages. A publicly held corporate purchaser could claim a credit equal to a percentage

of the entire purchase price. Thus, the publicly-held purchaser can obtain the same equipment at
a lower net cost. See infra note 228.
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D. Differing Calculationsof the Amount At Risk Under Section 465
and Under the Investment Tax Credit Section.

Once one determines the parameters of an "activity" under section
465, the amount-at-risk in that activity acts as a ceiling upon the
amount of loss a taxpayer can spill over from that activity to shelter
income derived from other, unrelated activities. The following considerations determine the taxpayer's amount-at-risk (AAR) in an activity
under section 465. The taxpayer becomes at-risk with respect to any
amount of money or property that he contributes to the section 465
activity. 177 If the taxpayer contributes property he becomes at-risk with
respect to an amount equal to the contributed property's adjusted basis
rather than its fair market value.' 78 In general, amounts borrowed and
contributed to any activity by a taxpayer qualify as amounts-at-risk if
he remains personally liable for repayment or if he has pledged unrelated property not used in the activity as security for the borrowed
amounts. 79 In this situation the taxpayer becomes at-risk with respect
to an amount equal to his80personal liability or the net fair market value
of the pledged property.'
Section 46(c)(8) incorporates section 465 criteria to determine the
amount of at-risk investment in section 38 property. Thus, if a taxpayer purchases five-year property, entitling him to an investment
credit of 10% of his qualified investment, and if he pays $40,000 for the
property in the form of $10,000 cash and a nonrecourse note of $30,000,
he has $10,000 at risk in the property. He can therefore receive a
$1,000 credit (10% of the $10,000 cash investment). Personal liability on
the $30,000 obligation would increase his AAR in the property to
$40,000, entitling him to a $4,000 credit.
When the taxpayer engages in any of the five suspect enumerated
activities remaining in section 465,181 however, the Code imposes a

much stricter rule.' 8 2 In these five activities, borrowed money does not
constitute an AAR if the taxpayer borrows it from a person with an
"interest"' 8 3 in the activity other than as a creditor, or from a person
177. See I.R.C. § 465(b)(l)(A) (1976).
178. See id.
179. I:R.C. § 465(b)(2) (1976).
180. See id.
181. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); supra notes 139-41 and accompanying
text.
182. See I.R.C. § 465(b)(3), (c)(3)(E) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
183. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-8, FED. TAXES
(P-H) T 20,648.38 (1982).
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who is "related" to the taxpayer.' 84 A literal reading of section 46(c)(8)
now applies these strict rules to the determination of credit for investment in eligible property used in any of the five activities even when
the activity generates no section 465(d) loss. Obviously, the determination of the AAR involves some complex considerations. Some even
more esoteric factors can apply, including (1) the effects of disqualified
loans on property other than that used in the five enumerated activities,
(2) special IRS contingency factors affecting the AAR, (3) the effects on
the AAR of a recourse note becoming nonrecourse, (4) the availability
of safe harbors for certain financing, and (5) the effects of a fluctuating
AAR on credit or recapture.
1. Effect of DisqualifledLoans on the Investment Credit. Under
the two-stage structure of section 465, a zero AAR has no independent
adverse effect on the taxpayer's activity producing the zero risk. A nonrecourse loan, for example, poses a tax problem only when the activities consuming the loan generate excess deductions and the taxpayer
attempts to transfer those excess deductions to shelter unrelated income. At that second stage, the absence of an AAR limits the taxpayer's ability to offset income with those excess deductions.
In contrast, under the one-dimensional approach of section
46(c)(8), "the basis of such property.

. .

shall not exceed the amount

the taxpayer is at-risk with respect to such property as of the close of
such taxable year."' 8 5 Consequently, the strict section 465 rules disqualify certain loans obtained to acquire eligible property, result in
zero at-risk investment in property used in the covered activities, and
prevent an apparently valid credit. If, for example, a farmer borrowed
$10,000 from a "related" person such as his sister, and used the funds
to purchase needed farm machinery, the loan would be disqualified. It
would produce zero AAR in, and zero investment credit for, the otherwise eligible section 38 equipment. The farmer could lose the entire
investment credit because of the nature of the financing for the prop184. Seeinfra notes 207-11 and accompanying text. Congress also authorized the Secretary of
the Treasury to extend this strict rule to other, non-statutory, activities by regulation. See I.R.C.
§ 465(b)(3)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The rule, on its face, appears to apply to all section 465
activities. The strict rule of section 465(b)(3) actually applies to the non-enumerated activities, i.e.,
those described in subparagraph (A) of section 465(c)(3) and those added to the section 465 coverage in the 1978 comprehensive extension of the section, only to the extent the Secretary so provides by regulation. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(E) (Supp. IV 1980). This interpretation of the Code

follows from the general rules of construction in the proposed regulations: "For the purposes of
the regulations under section 465, unless expressly provided otherwise, use of the term 'activity'
shall refer to an activity which is described in section 465(c)(1)." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.4659(c), FED. TAXES (P-H) 20,648.39(c) (1982).
185. I.R.C. § 46(c)(8) (West Supp. 1982).
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erty, even though in that same year he had no section 465(d) loss and
his farm in fact produced sizeable taxable income.
2. Other FactorsAffecting the AAR. The Treasury has developed other criteria in the tax abuse context of section 465 which may
foreclose recognition of AAR for a taxpayer even though he appears
subject to personal liability in his activity. Business enterprises now
subject to the at-risk restrictions of section 46(c)(8) will find their investment credit jeopardized if the financial arrangements for acquiring
the property possess any of these additional proscribed characteristics.
Section 465, for example, denies at-risk status to any amount "protected against loss through nonrecourse financing, guarantees, stop loss
agreements, or other similar arrangements."'18 6 Because this restriction
applies to all activities covered by section 465, rather than only to the
five enumerated suspect activities, it has a broad impact on a taxpayer's
investment tax credit. Although the taxpayer acquires property by contributing his own money or by borrowing funds from disinterested and
unrelated lenders on obligations for which he is personally liable, these
contributions will not generate an AAR if the IRS deems the taxpayer
protected against loss.' 87 As a corollary, collateralized nonrecourse
loans do not generate an AAR if the taxpayer is protected against loss
of the collateral. 88
The regulations extend this theory into surprising territories, and,
because of the ERTA, now affect the availability of the investment
credit. Thus, if a taxpayer must repay a loan only if a certain contingency occurs, whether such loan will give rise to an AAR depends upon
"the likelihood of the contingency occurring."' 89 If the Treasury considers the occurrence of the contingency "unlikely," then it deems the
taxpayer protected against loss and investment of the borrowed funds
produces no AAR.190
Thus, the Treasury and the taxpayer embark on an uncertain journey of predicting probabilities. Contingencies may be far beyond the
control of the taxpayer, but the Treasury's interpretation will prevail.
Our farmer, for example, may borrow $10,000 from a disinterested unrelated lender, pledge his future crops as security for the loan, and
agree to assume personal liability only if flooding destroys those crops.
186. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
187. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6(a), FED. TAXES (P-H) 20,648.36(a) (1982).
188. Id.
189. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6(c), FED. TAXES (P-H) I 20,648.36(c) (1982).
190. Id. The taxpayer has an AAR "if the likelihood of the contingency occurring is such that
or if the protection against loss does not
the taxpayer is not effectively protected against loss, ..
cover all likely possibilities." Id.
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The farmer may have become contingently liable for nothing because,
as the regulation states, the Treasury has determined that this loan arrangement effectively protects him against loss:
While drought is a constant concern for farmers in the area, flooding
is not. Accordingly, although . . .[the farmer] is personally liable
in the event of flooding .... [his] amount at risk will not be increased unless flooding actually occurs and destroys the crops, because the likelihood of flooding is such that ...[the farmer] is
effectively protected against loss.191
Recognizing the possibility that it may not possess infallible judgment
about the weather, the Treasury graciously allows the farmer to consider the $10,000 loan proceeds as producing an AAR at the end of any
192
year in which flooding does occur.
Under section 465, this Treasury position allows the farmer to deduct all expenses up to the amount equal to his farm income in dry
years, even though he has no AAR. In the year of the flood, he can
then take excess deductions from his farming activity, up to the $10,000
loan amount, as deductions to shelter income from other activities.
But, under section 46(c)(8)'s structure of the investment credit, the
farmer may never derive any tax benefit whatsoever from the purchase
of section 38 property with these funds. In later years, if the loan does
generate an AAR because a flood occurs and the farmer is no longer
deemed protected against loss, it is unclear whether the farmer will
then receive any investment credit benefit under section 46(c)(8). 193
3. Effect on the AAR of a Recourse Note That Becomes Nonrecourse. In the converse of our farmer's nonrecourse note that might
become recourse if a flood occurs, the Service has developed the position under section 465 that if an obviously recourse obligation becomes
nonrecourse upon the occurrence of an event or a lapse of time, the
Service may examine all of the facts and circumstances to determine if
the recourse note is sufficiently genuine to generate any at-risk investment. Specifically, the funds borrowed on such an obligation will produce an AAR only if the reasons for entering into the arrangement "are
primarily business motivated and not primarily related to Federal income tax consequences," and the "borrowing arrangement is consistent
191. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6(e)(Ex. 3), FED. TAXES (P-H) $ 20,648.36(e) (1982). Although the examples of the Treasury's proposed regulations only refer to situations where the
taxpayer engages in one of the five suspect activities enumerated in section 465(c)(1), the statutory
authorization of section 465(b)(4) to deny an AAR to those taxpayers who protect themselves from
loss is not limited to the five tainted activities. Presumably, therefore, these concepts apply to all
covered taxpayers and all covered activities.
192. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.465-6(e)(Ex. 3), FED. TAXES (P-H) 20,648.36(e)(Ex. 3)
(1982).
193. See infra text accompanying notes 217-22.
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with the normal commercial practice of financing the activity for which
94
the money is being borrowed."'
A recent Revenue Ruling t9 5 illustrates the type of scrutiny with
which the IRS views such obligations. A taxpayer had purchased
equipment having a seven-year useful life for a price of $275,000 consisting of $25,000 cash and a note in the amount of $250,000 for the
balance of the purchase price. The note did not require any payment
of principal before the end of its seven-year term. During that sevenyear term the taxpayer remained personally liable on the note. At the
end of that period, by paying an additional $10,000, the taxpayer could
convert the note into a nonrecourse obligation. The IRS observed that
the conversion occurred at a time when the equipment had been fully
depreciated, was "likely to have significantly declined in value," 19 6 and
occurred whether the value of the property remained sufficient to assure payment of the note. The Commissioner found, therefore, that the
reason for requiring the investor to personally assume liability during
the initial seven-year period was the tax-motivated desire to increase
the at-risk investment, and not to secure repayment of the note. 197 "Because the . . . financing arrangement [was] entered into primarily to
avoid the limitations of section 465 . . . and not primarily for business
reasons," 98 the Ruling determined that the $240,000 net amount of the
note (the $250,000 face value minus the $10,000 cash payment due for
the privilege of conversion to a nonrecourse note) was equivalent to a
nonrecourse note and generated no AAR even during the seven-year
period when the taxpayer was, on the face of the note, personally
liable. 199
194. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-5, FED. TAXES (P-H) T 20,648.35 (1982); see also Rev.
Rul. 413, 1978-2 C.B. 167.
195. Rev. Rul. 283, 1981-2 C.B. 115.
196. Id. at 116.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. The Service distinguished this result from the convertible recourse notes examined in the
legislative history of section 465 as genuine notes that generated an at-risk investment. Id. The
Service asserted that in the latter examples, the event that triggered the conversion of a note from
recourse to nonrecourse had "a substantial economic relationship to the activity": conversion
occurred when the property had grown sufficiently in value to serve as security for repayment of
the debt so that the lender no longer needed the personal liability of the taxpayer on the obligation
to assure his collection of the note. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 n.l (1976),
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 57, 86 n.l. The Senate Finance Committee used as an illustration a note
that converted from recourse to nonrecourse when an orchard reached a certain stage of development. See id In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee recognized that a recourse
loan would be genuine and create an AAR even though it became nonrecourse when a specified
event occurred-in the case of a note obtained to acquire a movie, at the time when a movie
"reaches a certain stage of completion or generates a certain level of box office receipts." H. R.
REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 n.10 (1975), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 701, 802 n.10.
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The Service's position on convertible recourse notes is clearly directed at tax abuses. Under section 465 this position would have no
initial adverse tax consequence to a businessman or investor who was
not trying to spill over excess deductions from one activity in order to
shelter unrelated income derived from another activity. In contrast, the
IRS position reaches further in the investment credit area because it
applies at the outset to deny the taxpayer an at-risk investment in
otherwise eligible property. The taxpayer will lose the entire credit at
the outset if the Service determines that the arrangement has no substantial economic basis. At best, this creates a new source of dispute
with the government as to the taxpayer's motive for his financing arrangement, and adds another element of uncertainty with respect to the
availability of the investment credit.
4. The Investment Credit Safe Harborfor "Certain Financ-

ing." A "qualified investment" now generally depends on the taxpayer's personal liability when acquiring eligible section 38 property.
Some of the problems with determining this liability have been discussed above. The ERTA did, however, add a safe harbor for certain
borrowed amounts that otherwise generate no personal liability.2°°
Section 46(c)(8) now generally allows a purchaser of section 38 property to claim an AAR equal to 100% of the borrowed amount if (1) he is
at-risk for an amount equal to at least 20% of the basis of the eligible
property;20 (2) he acquires the property from a person other than a
"related person;" and (3) he borrows only from a "qualified person" or
2
any federal, state or local government. 20
Congress apparently designed these safe harbor provisions to mobilize private financial institutions in the attack on tax shelter schemes.
If an unrelated financial institution will lend as much as 80% of the
acquisition cost of eligible section 38 property, relying solely on the
security of the property, then presumably the loan transaction constitutes prima facie evidence that the reported value of the property is
reasonable. The Service, in turn, must assume that the taxpayer has
not overvalued the property to obtain an inflated depreciation and investment credit basis. The use of the private sector in this way is
sound, but the statutory requirements are cumbersome and create pitfalls for the unwary purchaser of section 38 property.
One pitfall looms in the meaning of the term "related person. '20 3
200.
201.
rules of
202.
203.

ERTA § 211 (codified at I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1982)).
Section 46(c)(8)(B)(ii) requires that the basis of eligible property be computed under the
I.R.C. § 168(d)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1982).
I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1982).
The crucial definition of a "related person" reads as follows:
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The benefits of the safe harbor do not accrue to a taxpayer who acquires the property from a related seller. 20 4 Certain family members

are clearly related. 20 5 In addition, the safe harbor is not available if the
taxpayer acquires section 38 property from a corporation or partner-

ship in which he or the lender directly or indirectly owns more than
10% of the value of all equity interests. 20 6 Reciprocally, if the seller of

the property owns more than 10% of the value of all equity interests in
the taxpayer or the lender, he is a related person, and the taxpayer
20 7
cannot use the safe harbor.

Even tighter rules govern the qualification of lenders under the
safe harbor. Related family members are clearly disqualified. 20 8 To

qualify, traditional institutions such as banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, insurance companies, certain pension trusts, and
others actually and regularly engaged in the business of lending money
may not be related to the taxpayer, and may not be the seller or related
to the seller. 20 9 Thus, the lender of a nonrecourse loan does not qualify

under the safe harbor a taxpayer seeks if the taxpayer or the seller directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of the value of all the lender's

equity interests. 210 Nor will the lender qualify if it owns more than 10%
of the value of all equity interests in the taxpayer or the seller.2 1' Non-

recourse loans from pension trusts and commercial lenders face further
barriers: any overlapping ownership of equity interest between the
lender, the taxpayer, and the seller or person related thereto, will pre212
vent the nonrecourse loan from qualifying under the safe harbor.

For purposes of this paragraph, the term "related person" has the same meaning as such
term is used in section 168(e)(4), except that in applying section 168(e)(4)(D)(i) in the
case of a person described in subparagraph (D)(i)(II) of this paragraph, sections 267(b)
and 707(b)(1) shall be applied by substituting "zero percent" for "50 percent."
I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(E) (West Supp. 1982). I.R.C. section 168(e)(4) (West Supp. 1982), one of the four
Code sections cross-referenced in the definition of a "related person," cross-references I.R.C. section 52 which, in turn, cross-references and modifies I.R.C. section 1563. Such drafting of a key
definition in a safe harbor provision makes a mockery of Congress' avowed aim to simplify the
new rules on the investment credit.
204. See I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1982).
205. Tainted family members include the taxpayer's spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and
brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood). See I.R.C. § 267(b), (c)(4) (1976).
206. See I.R.C.§ 168(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1982). The test of "more than 10%" is applied at
the time the taxpayer acquires the section 38 property. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF
ERTA, supra note 38, at 109.
207. For an explanation of a "related person" under section 168(e)(4)(D), see JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 109.
208. I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(B)(ii)(I), (D)(ii) (West Supp. 1982).
209. See I.R.C. §§ 46(c)(8)(E), 168(e)(4), 52(a), (b), 1563 (West Supp. 1982).
210. See I.R.C. §§ 46(c)(8)(E), 168(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1982); JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 109.
211. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 97.
212. This conclusion follows from the modification made by enactment of I.R.C. section
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Latent dangers exist even for a loan that appears to meet the safe
harbor requirements. 213 Suppose a taxpayer purchases property from
someone not related to him, has an at-risk investment of 20% of the
basis of the property, and borrows the other 80% from a qualified
lender not related to him or the seller. The ERTA's legislative history
reveals that the IRS may recharacterize such transactions, originally
cast in the form of a financing arrangement between the taxpayer and a
lender, as a sale or lease. This recharacterization would make the
lender also the person from whom property was acquired, and thus
disqualify him as a lender. The taxpayer would then lose the benefit of
the safe harbor,214 and the nonrecourse loan would generate no AAR
and zero qualified investment for the investment credit.
The safe harbor restrictions that mandate a qualified lender, however, only apply during the first twelve months of a loan. 21 5 Once this
period elapses, arrangements may be made to transfer the loan to a
nonqualified person without adversely affecting the taxpayer's AAR.
Thus, with one major caveat, after twelve months a person related to
the taxpayer or the seller could assume safe harbor 80% nonrecourse
loans previously held by, say, an independent bank. Because during
the first twelve months the existence of an agreement to transfer the
loan to an unqualified person is fatal, and because the statute does not
require the agreement to be in writing, any transfer shortly after the
twelve-month period would justify an inquiry by the IRS to determine
whether an unwritten agreement or understanding to make the transfer
had existed. Such an agreement would retroactively disqualify the
loan. For example, if a seller usually finances sales of its equipment
through a qualified independent bank, but also regularly arranges for
the transfer of the financing in month thirteen of every loan to an organization related to the seller, the IRS will undoubtedly contend that
such a pattern evidences a pre-existing agreement that disqualifies the
entire transaction from safe harbor treatment.
As the statute now stands, sophisticated promoters of tax shelter
opportunities with constant access to skilled tax counsel can profitably
take advantage of the safe harbor. The small businessman or closely
46(c)(8)(E) (West Supp. 1982), which reduced to zero the 10% control test of I.R.C. section

168(e)(4)(D)(i) (West Supp. 1982).
213. See JOINT COMMITTEE

EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 97; I.R.C,

§ 46(c)(8)(D)(i)(II), (iv) (West Supp. 1982).
214. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 97; I.R.C.

§ 46(c)(8)(D)(i)(II), (iv) (West Supp. 1982).
215. I.R.C. § 47(d)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
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held business, however, with no pervasive tax avoidance motive and no
experience in tax shelter concepts, will probably not attempt to use the
safe harbor.216 Even knowledgeable businessmen may be reluctant to
spend the money and time necessary to understand and comply with
the technical requirements of the statute, and then search out the data
on the underlying equity ownership of the equipment seller, the financ-

ing institution, and possibly related persons for each item of section 38
property purchased and financed. Such costs could easily outweigh the

tax savings that would otherwise be gained from the investment credit.
In the last analysis, the safe harbor may primarily serve as an accommodation for the putative tax shelterer.
5. FluctuatingAAR CausesAdditionalInvestment Creditor Recapture. Under section 465, a complex set of regulations governs increases and decreases in a taxpayer's AAR in an activity. 21 7 In lieu of

extending the scope of these regulations, Congress adopted new sections to control increases in the taxpayer's AAR under the investment
credit2 18 and to control recapture of the credit when the taxpayer's
216. It is appropriate to compare the safe harbor of section 46(c)(8) and the safe harbor of the
leveraged lease arrangements in section 168(f)(8)(B)(ii). A publicly held company remains exempt
from the general at-risk provisions of the investment credit under section 46(c)(8) and can obtain
the full credit notwithstanding its use of nonrecourse financing, its zero AAR, and its active use of
investment credits from one activity to shelter income derived from an unrelated activity. See
supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text. If, however, such corporations wish to transfer their
investment credits from a loss company to a profitable company under a leveraged lease arrangement, Congress requires the lessor to have a minimum investment of 10% in the adjusted basis of
the property. The 10% equity investment includes consideration paid or recourse debt incurred by
the lessor in acquiring the property. The limitation also requires that the lessor not obtain the 10%
investment from the lessee or a person related to the lessee. No restrictions apply to the funds
representing the remaining 90% of the cost of the property. The funds, therefore. may consist of
nonrecourse financing or of funds wholly borrowed from related persons. Because the leveraged
lease rules do not incorporate section 465 restrictions, public companies that transfer credits are
not enmeshed in the web of section 465 regulations. Moreover, the leveraged lease sections deviate expressly from the approach of section 465(b)(4): the amount that the lessor has at risk in the
property will not be affected by the existence of an agreement that may protect the lessor or the
lessee against loss by requiring a purchase or sale of the equipment at a fixed price at the end of
the lease term. I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(E) (repealed 1976).
The TEFRA eliminated some of these discrepancies. The safe harbor leasing rules are not
available for leases entered into by certain related parties. See TEFRA § 208(b). The TEFRA
does, however, operate to exclude closely held corporate lessors--other than personal service companies-from the section 465 rules if the safe harbor leasing activity involves certain types of
depreciable property and if the lease is entered into or the property placed in service after July 1.
1982. In this situation, the closely held lessor will be considered at-risk in an amount equal to the
amount that the lessee-as true owner-would have been considered at-risk if true economic substance controlled the classification of all the parties. See id.
217. See Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.465-20 to -26, -38, -39, -41, FED. TAXES (P-H)
(1982).
218. See I.R.C. § 46(c)(9) (West Supp. 1982).
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AAR decreases. 219 Under these new provisions, the taxpayer's AAR in
a particular property increases only when he increases his actual investment in the property. Repayment of nonrecourse debt incurred to acquire section 38 property increases the taxpayer's AAR in that item;
repayment of recourse debt does not.220 Under the new sections, unlike
sections 465,221 reinvested operating profits do not increase the AAR
for investment credit purposes unless the taxpayer can trace those profits to investments in eligible section 38 property or to repayment of
nonrecourse debt incurred by investment in section 38 property. If the
taxpayer does increase his AAR in any property, he recomputes his
investment credit as if he had been personally liable for the increased
amount when the property was originally placed in service.222 A resulting increase in credit decreases the tax due in the year of the actual
investment increase.
Similarly, a taxpayer's AAR in section 38 property decreases if his
investment in the property decreases. Under the new provisions, in
contrast to section 465, neither distributions of money from a business
or investment activity nor ACRS or depreciation deductions reduce the
taxpayer's AAR in a particular piece of eligible property. 223 The section 46(c)(8) property-by-property analysis does, however, decrease the
AAR when a taxpayer converts recourse debt on a piece of property
into a form of nonrecourse debt or debt for which the Code treats the
224
taxpayer as not at-risk.
Decreases in the AAR can change recapture, just as increases can
a
change the amount of credit. Prior to the enactment of the ERTA,
225 If
recapture of investment credit depended solely on the time factor.
the original taxpayer held the property for the required period, he was
not subject to recapture. Congress, however, added a new dimension of
complexity: changes in the nature of the financing prior to the expiration of the appropriate holding period can trigger premature recapture.226 If the taxpayer reduces his at-risk investment in any property,
the credit originally allowed for acquisition of that property must be
219. See I.R.C. § 47(d) (West

Supp.

1982).

220. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 99.
221. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-22(c), FED. TAXES (P-H) 20,648.52 (1979) (allowing
reinvested operating profits derived from a business activity to increase AAR in that activity).
222. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 99.

223. See id at 99-100. If the financing fulfills the requirements of the safe harbor of section
47(d)(2), the transfer of a loan from a qualified lender to a non-qualified lender, after the 12month grace period, will not reduce the taxpayer's AAR. See I.R.C. § 47(d)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
224. See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 38, at 99-100.
225. See I.R.C. § 47 (West 1967 & Supp. 1982).
226. See ERTA § 211(0(2), 231-33 (codified at I.R.C. § 47(d) (West Supp. 1982)).
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redetermined as if the taxpayer had invested only the reduced AAR
when he originally placed the property in service. Any excess credit
previously allowed increases his tax liability in the year in which the
227
AAR decreases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By enacting the ERTA and the TEFRA, Congress not only made
the investment tax credit more lucrative, but also introduced at-risk
rules designed to protect the credit from misuse by zealous tax shelterers. The at-risk rules, however, constitute a case of overkill. The language of section 46(c)(8) often denies the investment credit to
profitable, active small businesses that engage in no tax sheltering activities and no abusive practices. The Code simply presumes them
guilty of abuse when they purchase property, normally eligible for the
investment credit, with a form of financing that involves no personal
liability. The at-risk provisions mete out the same tax punishment for
nonrecourse financing-a denial of the investment credit-to the tax
shelterer and to the legitimate small business alike.
Although the at-risk concepts of section 465 and section 46(c)(8)
both aim to limit otherwise allowable tax preferences to the amount of
the taxpayer's genuine economic investment, the effect of section
46(c)(8) is much more draconian. Because the code measures the atrisk amount in the investment credit field on a property-by-property
approach, the new at-risk rules of section 46(c)(8) completely deny an
investment tax credit to taxpayers who, under section 465, would feel
no adverse consequences until their otherwise allowable deductions exceeded the amount of income derived from their activity. Section 465
only limits a taxpayer's use of losses from one activity to reduce tax on
income from an unrelated activity; it does not represent an absolute
statutory condemnation of nonrecourse indebtedness, which often
serves legitimate commercial purposes existing independent of tax considerations. 228 In section 46(c)(8), the section 465 rules are extended
227. See I.R.C. § 47(d)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
228. For an illustration of one legitimate, independently motivated use of nonrecourse financing, see supra note 176. Another important use of nonrecourse financing involves sole proprietors
and closely held corporations seeking to expand their capital base. Principal lenders often draft
sophisticated loan agreements that limit the borrowing power of these businesses. These loan
agreements often permit the use of nonrecourse financing, which does not affect personal liability.
Thus, nonrecourse borrowing may represent the only financing alternative open to these businesses desiring to acquire new machinery and equipment normally eligible for the investment
credit. In these instances, the use of the at-risk provisions as the sole criterion for tax shelter

activity again operates to disadvantage privately held companies in competing with their publicly
held counterparts.
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beyond their spirit when they are used to create an unfair and often
inaccurate presumption of tax shelter activity for every item of tangible
depreciable property acquired with a nonrecourse loan. If the investment credit is to survive as an effective tax expenditure, Congress
must avoid burdening the subsidy with overbroad anti-tax-shelter
machinery.
Congress could alter this harsh approach by according the same
treatment to investment credits under section 46(c)(8) as to deductions
under section 465. This would involve incorporating into section
46(c)(8) the two-stage activity structure of section 465 so that the investment credit would be fully available to a taxpayer deriving income
from only one activity, trade or business. At-risk restrictions would
operate only if the taxpayer attempted to use the investment credit generated from an originating activity as a device to shelter tax on income
derived from a second unrelated or unaggregated activity.
Congress might even go further and reevaluate the broad coverage
of both sections 465 and 46(c)(8) with an eye toward eliminating the
present discrimination against small businesses in favor of large, widely
held corporations. 229 Small taxpayers must face the complex at-risk restrictions and burdens of compliance described in this article even
when involved in active businesses with no tax avoidance conduct, yet
large corporations remain immune from administrative and judicial
scrutiny under the at-risk rules even if they invest in aggressive and
questionable tax shelters. A more reasoned approach suggests that the
Code use objective criteria that more accurately focus on the legitimacy
of a business enterprise. A considered expansion of the active participation concept of section 465(c)(3)(B), for example, could ensure the
existence of a legitimate business venture. In this way the Code could
distinguish between the tax shelterer who deserves to face the rigorous
new at-risk tests and the actively managed enterprise carrying on a
bona fide trade or business that deserves to be free of the at-risk exposure even if it does happen to be small and closely held.

229. In light of other statutory and administrative anti-tax-shelter weapons, see supra note
123, the need for the current discrimination against privately held businesses appears, at best, to
deserve further review and discussion.
In the context of safe harbor leasing transactions, the TEFRA exempts certain closely held
corporations from the at-risk provisions of the Code. See supra note 216. This exclusion is worthy
of support and expansion, but is unfortunately scheduled to terminate with the expiration of the
safe harbor lease provisions on December 31, 1983.

